2026-27 Season

Oregon 2026-27 Basketball Preview

Incoming roster, transfer portal & newcomers

EvanMiya Roster Rank

#26–34

EM Offense

32–40

EM Defense

21–28

Bart Torvik T-Rank

#30

Torvik Defense

36

Torvik Offense

28

2026-27 preseason projections. Jon Rothstein at FanDuel lands close to Torvik with Oregon at 36. All three sources have Oregon as a tournament team. The systems weight things differently; Torvik leans more heavily on prior production, while EvanMiya is more willing to extrapolate strong rate stats into bigger roles. Note: EM's range has slipped a few spots in the last update as other programs have continued to add; the talent on the roster hasn't changed.

Articles

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Projected Opening Lineup Experience-heavy · 256 combined career starts

Lead Guard

Fred Payne

SR · 6-1 · Boston College

31 career starts

Wing

Tyrone Riley IV

JR · 6-6 · San Francisco

65 career starts

Wing

Andrew Meadow

SR · 6-7 · Boise State

68 career starts

Stretch 4

Taylor Bol Bowen

SR · 6-10 · Alabama

39 career starts

Center

Sean Stewart

SR · 6-9 · Returning

53 career starts

Starters (5)

256

Bench (9)

8

Career starts. 7 of the bench's 8 are Jerry Easter covering for injury at USC.

The read

I think Altman is likely to lean into experience early in the season. Based on his comments that “we're going to get some guys who have played a lot of basketball,” I suspect this is the starting lineup come November. All five projected starters have logged at least a full year as a starter in college, and three bring high-major proven experience. Even the two who came up at the mid-major level carry substantial starting resumes: Riley with 65 career starts at San Francisco, Meadow with 68 at Boise State. That stability lets the highest-projected pieces ramp up at their own pace.

Watch as the season progresses: Dwayne Aristode (4.28 BPR projection) and Pharaoh Compton (4.36 projection) have a real path into the starting lineup. Aristode … an Arizona freshman buried last year … has the highest pure projection among the bench guys. Compton … one career start … is the team's best big by EM and could displace Stewart at the 5 once he settles in.

The Island of Misfit Toys Reclamation projects, projectable traits, Torvik Talent rank #12

I've seen it said that Oregon is building "an island of misfit toys." It's not nothing. There's a real case for that read, and there's an equally real case for the opposite read. Both sides of the argument start in the same place: there are many players on this roster who were very highly rated coming out of high school and have not lived up to it.

The data point that lends credence to the take

Bart Torvik runs a column called Talent in his preseason projections. It's not part of his actual T-Rank model (he treats it as a side note), but it's a structured number. The formula is roughly recruiting composite rankings × projected minutes, age-adjusted. By that math, Oregon's roster grades out as the 12th most talented in the country.

Now hold that number against where Torvik actually projects Oregon: #33. A 21-spot gap between "what the bodies were rated coming out of high school" and "what the model thinks they'll do this year" is a big story of this roster.

The roster splits cleanly in two

  • Three projected starters: Fred Payne, Tyrone Riley, Andrew Meadow. Came out of nowhere. No five-star pedigree, no national hype, no top-100 recruiting label. They got to where they are by actually producing at the college level. The track record is the resume.
  • The bench: Aristode, Bol Bowen, Ariza, Jasper Johnson, Jerry Easter, Pharaoh Compton, Sean Stewart, all borderline five-star pedigree. Every one of them was a high-priority high school recruit. None of them got to where they are by lighting up college basketball at their first stop. Six of the seven are portal pickups; Ariza is the one HS recruit in the group.

The pessimistic read: scratched lottery tickets

This is the "island of misfit toys" read in full. The previous program was right about each of these guys. Their original schools saw what was actually there over a year or two of practice and game tape, decided the player wasn't who the recruiting profile said, and let them walk. Oregon is now buying the old reputation… the version of these guys from two, three, four years ago when limited HS exposure built up an inflated picture… and paying premium portal dollars for it. If the previous staffs were correct, we are massively overpaying for talent that's already been exposed.

Jasper Johnson and Taylor Bol Bowen were both essentially run out of town. USC wasn't sad to lose Jerry Easter; Kentucky wasn't sad to lose Jasper; Alabama wasn't sad to lose Bol Bowen. The market for these players, post-fall-from-grace, was thin. We didn't have to beat the entire portal for them. We didn't have to fend off the world for Sean Stewart. Dwayne Aristode was still available very late in the process, without a lengthy list of blue-blood suitors. That is, in one telling, a warning signal. To keep torturing metaphors: we're shopping in a Ferrari junkyard.

The optimistic read: reclamation projects, projectable traits

The optimistic read has a few parts.

1. High school recruiting rankings are mostly a bet on projectable physical traits. When 247 or Rivals ranks a kid in the top-50 nationally, the headline-driving number is rarely "good shooter, low turnover, plays winning basketball." It's "absurd athlete, length, frame, motor, could be an NBA defender." Those traits don't go away after a bad freshman year. They might not get turned into production at school #1 (that's a coaching and role question), but the body is still the body. Oregon's roster is loaded with NBA-track athletic profiles even where the production hasn't shown up yet.

2. You can't decrease anyone's compensation. If a program pays a kid $1M out of high school and he doesn't hit, the program can't turn around and pay him $500K next year, even if $500K is exactly what he's worth. The politics, the egos, and the relationships involved simply don't allow it. The same thing is true in every other industry: try to cut someone's pay and they leave. Maybe they go find that same lower number someplace else, but they walk away with a fresh start, rather than take the public price-cut from the people who originally bet on them. So when a high-rated freshman doesn't quite become what his original school paid him to be, the natural exit is the portal, not because the player has no value but because the original program can't price him correctly anymore. The portal is full of guys who are worth real money but whose previous price tag made staying impossible.

3. Many of these guys were in the wrong role at school #1. The clearest case on this roster is the Jasper Johnson / Jerry Easter swap I make in their individual writeups. Due to injuries and other roster construction, Kentucky tried to make a shooter into a primary ball-handler. USC tried to make a primary ball-handler into a floor-spacing wing. Swap them (Easter to Kentucky's PG role, Jasper to USC's catch-and-shoot wing role) and I think both stories look completely different.

4. There are real precedents. The pattern of "high-rated recruit, didn't pop at school #1, transferred and broke out" is now a regular feature of the college basketball cycle. A short non-exhaustive list of recent reclamations:

  • Hunter Sallis (Gonzaga → Wake Forest). 247 No. 10 overall, five-star in 2022. Buried behind Nolan Hickman and Rasir Bolton at Gonzaga for two years; played 11.6 MPG as a sophomore. Transferred to Wake and went off: 18.0 PPG on 48/40/79 splits, ACC Most Improved, NBA Combine invite. The cleanest miscast-freshman-to-star arc you'll find.
  • Mark Mitchell (Duke → Missouri). 247 No. 19 overall, five-star in 2022. Two years at Duke as a low-usage glue piece, never the offensive option his recruiting profile suggested. Transferred to Mizzou and immediately became a primary option: 14.0 PPG, All-SEC second team, real NBA Draft buzz.
  • Baba Miller (Florida State → FAU). 247 No. 32 / ESPN top-30 international recruit. Two miscast years at FSU (suspended part of his freshman year, never developed an offensive role). Transferred to FAU and finally clicked: 13.4 PPG, expanded shooting, stretch-four NBA prospect again.
  • Chance Westry (Auburn → Syracuse). Top-50 in 2022. Auburn role didn't materialize; bounced back at Syracuse.

The arc is not unusual. It is also not a guarantee; for every Sallis there's an Aaron Bradshaw (No. 4 overall recruit, Kentucky → Ohio State → Memphis → Tennessee State, never developed at any stop and now closing his career at an HBCU in the OVC) where the reclamation never lands. Oregon has placed multiple bets on this curve at once; some will work, some won't.

The scheme argument: this version of the roster fits where Altman wants to go

The most overlooked piece of the upside read: this roster, regardless of recruiting tape, is built for the old version of Altman basketball he has quietly been saying he wants to play.

The last era of Oregon rosters was anchored around Nate Bittle and N'Faly Dante, bigs who couldn't switch onto guards, which locked Oregon into a drop-coverage five and a relatively static defensive scheme. The matchup-zone identity and the press-and-flip looks Altman has been most successful with historically all require switchable, mobile, versatile defenders. The Bittle/Dante teams couldn't do that consistently.

Now look at the new roster: top to bottom, 6-5 to 6-9, athletic, switchable, can all run, can all defend multiple positions. Every one of the high-recruit "misfit" pieces was rated highly originally because of athletic profile, which is the exact trait this defensive scheme demands. Altman explicitly said this offseason that "we know the way we want to play." The same athletic upside that made each of these guys a borderline five-star coming out of high school is what makes them great fits into a 2014-2021 Altman scheme.

Run that scheme (press, hybrid man, matchup zone behind it) with a deep roster of switchable athletes, and you have a defensive identity that the Bittle/Dante teams couldn't run. The downside is that some of these guys will continue to underperform the recruiting label. The upside is that we have ten bodies who can credibly play this style at a high level. Even if half of them just stay at "useful, switchable rotation piece," that could be a defensive monster.

Where this lands

It's likely that both readings are at least a little bit true. We will find out which one dominates over the course of the season. If everyone else was smarter than us and the bodies are a collection of scratched lottery tickets, we are paying premium portal dollars for diminished assets and the defense doesn't have the talent it appears to have. If the projectable traits are still projectable… and the role / scheme / development environment was the actual problem at school #1 for several of these players… we have assembled a roster with a higher athletic ceiling than the 33rd-most-talented projection implies.

It's an interesting construction. The starters with previous production form a good floor, and then there is a large number of high-variance, high-ceiling bench bets that could change it all. There's even a version where we don't need any of them to reach their full potential to reach a really optimistic outcome. We just need their traits to fit better in our scheme than they did in their last one.

The Value of Doing Your Own Thing Why distinctive schemes beat conventional ones in college

Most conversations about strategy in sports are about which system is best in the abstract. I don't think that's the right question in college basketball. In a sport with capped practice time, where you play most opponents once a year, the more useful question is which system gets the most out of your prep and the least out of theirs. The two answers aren't the same.

The practice-time math

NCAA rules cap in-season practice at 20 hours a week. Some of that is conditioning, some is shooting, some is film. The on-court team work (installing your offense, drilling your defense, running game-situation reps) is maybe a third of the total.

Now think about what opposing teams do to prepare for you. They get a couple of practices. By the time the ball tips on game day, an opponent has spent something like five to ten hours specifically prepping for what you do. You've spent months building it.

Two things fall out of that ratio. First, the technique edge that comes from sheer reps is yours, not theirs. Second (the part that gets less attention): if your system is unusual, the opponent's prep starts from scratch every time. If your system is conventional, your opponent has been prepping for you all season.

Where you see the pattern

You can find a version of this argument across programs that have over-performed their on-paper talent over long stretches.

Tony Bennett's pack-line at Virginia, Jim Boeheim's 2-3 at Syracuse, Mark Few's 2-big at Gonzaga... and its offshoot, Tommy Lloyd's 2-big at Arizona.

The clearest current version is Dan Hurley's UConn. Two national titles in a row with a system almost nobody mirrors in prep. While the rest of college basketball is simplifying around spacing and high pick-and-roll, UConn is hanging banners with complex horns sets, motion offense, double curls, and catch-and-shoot off movement. The interesting wrinkle: under Hurley, UConn is dramatically better at the end of the season than the beginning. That's exactly the pattern you'd predict from a doing-your-own-thing edge; the prep gap is biggest after a full season of teaching and practice.

In football, Jim Harbaugh at Stanford running power football with multiple offensive linemen and tight ends when everyone else was in the spread. The service academies (Air Force, Navy) running a triple option that's nearly extinct elsewhere. Neither program should win consistently against bigger schools by any honest measure of recruiting class, and both regularly do, in part because opponents have to install something from scratch for one game a year.

These schemes in the abstract aren't "the best", but don't tell that to the teams dealing with the sudden execution upgrade from their scout team to the real deal.

What this looks like for Altman

Dana Altman runs a matchup zone. There aren't very many high-major programs who run it: UAB, Merrimack, Utah State (now Cincinnati), George Washington, and Oregon. St. John's and San Diego State run hybrid versions, not full matchup. Syracuse historically. On the broader college landscape, matchup zone is an uncommon base.

More accurately, Altman runs matchup zone and man-to-man and the 3/4-court trap, and varies between them the way a pitcher varies fastball, curveball, and changeup. When the opponent inbounds the ball, they don't know which one is coming until they see it. The matchup zone is the most distinctive piece, but the whole package is the system, and the opponent has to decode it in real time, every possession, without a steady look to plan against.

That means every Big Ten team Oregon plays is preparing not for one defense they otherwise see twice a year, but for a rotating mix where the timing of the switches is itself part of the scheme. Their players have spent maybe a couple of practices talking about how to attack the high post against a matchup zone... never mind the man and the trap. Our players have spent four months running all three.

You can also see this in our actual NCAA tournament history. Two of the last three times Oregon has been knocked out of the tournament, it's been by a team that had already seen us multiple times: USC in the 2021 Sweet 16, the third meeting between us that year, and Arizona in the 2025 second round, a team that had just left the Pac-12 but whose roster had been playing us repeatedly for years. The losses came to teams that were already very familiar with us.

When Oregon faces a tournament opponent that hasn't seen us, the pattern flips. The cleanest example is the 2021 second-round win over a #2-seeded Iowa team featuring Luka Garza, the national player of the year. Iowa came in without a meaningful book on what we do and we blew their doors off. The pattern shows up at the macro level too: Dana Altman is undefeated in the first round of the NCAA tournament at Oregon. It's why every other coach speaks highly of Altman, and playing him in a game that matters scares the crap out of them.

Why this is a college thing

A reasonable question is why this isn't universal coaching strategy. The argument breaks down against professionals. NBA players have spent their lives in basketball, played every defense, every wrinkle, for years; Boeheim's 2-3 wouldn't fool them for more than a minute or two. NBA staffs have unlimited prep time, full video, none of the constraints that define a college matchup. The truly meaningful games are played in 7-game series, where you really get to know the other side. Teams that have funky wrinkles can do well in the regular season but then usually go home early.

The doing-your-own-thing edge needs three things only college reliably provides:

  • Players early in their development curve, many of whom haven't seen your scheme before.
  • The NCAA's 20-hour cap on prep hours. The cap is the friend of the distinctive team.
  • Roster turnover that prevents institutional knowledge of how to beat you from accumulating.

These apply in high school and college in a way they don't anywhere else. It's one of the true reasons that college basketball, and college sports, are awesome. Because styles make fights. And college rewards people with style.

The downsides

  • You start the year slow. A distinctive system is a heavy install. Players have to learn a ton of new stuff, and they're seeing game speed against it for the first time. The early-season schedule is part of the price you pay.
  • You have to pass on certain archetypes. Guys who are good in matchup zone are usually also good in man-to-man, so the recruiting pool isn't smaller in any absolute sense. But there are specific archetypes (slow-footed bigs, ball-stoppers who can't navigate screens, players who can't see the floor in the high post) that fit a conventional scheme just fine and don't fit matchup. You forfeit those players, even when they have real traits.
  • A lot of guys don't want to do it. It's hard. Players may not get it right away. They don't always think it will prepare them for the NBA or the next level. They're wrong about that part, but it's what they think, and it's what other coaches can sell against you in recruiting.
The Trap Isn't About Turnovers How the press-and-flip actually works, and why small-ball amplifies it

If you watch Oregon press and judge it by turnovers forced, you'll come away unimpressed. We don't get a lot of them. Most people watching casually take that to mean the press isn't working. I think it's doing exactly what it's supposed to do. Turnovers were never the point.

What's actually being run

The textbook reason to press is to force turnovers. Steals, deflections, eight-second backcourt violations. If that's what you want, you run a Shaka Smart-style Havoc press where you commit hard and live with the threes you give up when it breaks down. That's a high-variance press for a high-variance reason.

What Altman actually runs isn't just a trap. When the full thing is on, there's a full-court trap, a three-quarter-court trap (the one we use most often, technically a 2-2-1), and behind the press either a matchup zone or man-to-man. He flips between them, mixes them, and the looks all start the same way. It's exactly like a pitcher throwing a four-seamer, a two-seamer, and a changeup with the same arm action: the hitter has seen all three before, but at the moment of release he doesn't know which is coming. Oregon's opponents have seen the defenses on film. They just can't tell which one they're looking at when the possession starts.

The real cost to the opponent isn't turnovers. It's that they have to think their way through the defense step by step. Where's the pressure? Is it a trap or a contain? What's behind it? What offense are we running against it? By the time they figure out what they're looking at, fifteen seconds of the shot clock can be gone.

That's the point. Time spent decoding the defense is time not spent running offense.

The 3/4 trap is about cadence

The full-court trap has real peril for both sides. Good guards can punish it; good execution on breaking it leads directly to easy buckets.

The 2-2-1 is different. It's not very dangerous either way. It isn't that tough to break, and there isn't much danger for the defense behind it. Both teams are basically okay with the trade as a baseline.

So why run it as the default? Because it costs the opponent five seconds where their point guard has to deal with something. Five seconds where, instead of walking the ball up and yelling out the play call, they're navigating pressure and having to make a couple swing passes. The offense doesn't get to set up in its normal way.

Five seconds of sideline-communication disruption, repeated 40 times a game, is a real edge.

Why time off the shot clock matters more than you'd think

Points per chance (the value of a single shot opportunity, where each offensive rebound starts a new chance) drops sharply as the shot clock runs down. Oregon's own offensive numbers from last season are a clean illustration. Chances that ended in the 10-to-20 second window (mid-clock) produced 0.89 PPC. Chances that ended in the 20-to-30 second window (late-clock) produced 0.72 PPC. That's a 19% drop in shot-attempt efficiency just from being pushed deeper into the clock. The pass options shrink, the defenders are set, the shot is usually contested and rushed.

Oregon offensive points-per-chance by shot clock segment, from CBBAnalytics. 0-10 sec: 0.99. 10-20 sec: 0.89 (highlighted in green). 20-30 sec: 0.72 (highlighted in red).
Oregon's 25-26 offensive efficiency (points per chance) by shot clock segment. Source: CBBAnalytics.

(The 0-to-10 second bucket clocks in at 0.99 PPC, but it's a different category; transition baskets and broken plays inflate it, not half-court offense. The meaningful comparison is mid-clock against late-clock.)

Now compound it. If the press-and-decode sequence pushes a meaningful fraction of the opponent's chances out of the mid-clock bucket and into the late-clock bucket, that's 0.17 PPC coming off every one of those shifted chances. Aggregate offensive efficiency drops without any single dramatic event, and the points add up across a season.

Turnovers are a nice bonus, but certainly not necessary to harvest fractions of a point every single possession. And that will add up if opposing teams don't figure out a way to seriously punish the Ducks for wasting their time.

The small-ball multiplier

The other half of the strategy is what small-ball does for our defense. The recent era of Oregon bigs (Bittle, Dante, Diawara, Demir) locked us into drop coverage on every pick-and-roll. None of them could switch onto a guard. None of them were particularly good in the press. The opponent's pick-and-roll game against us was always the same dance because we had one coverage available.

Compton, Stewart, and Bol Bowen are different. All three can credibly switch a possession onto a guard. All three can hold up in the press. And all three would beat any of last era's bigs in a footrace down the floor.

The transition piece is real too. The small-ball lineups can push the ball after a defensive rebound the way last year's lineups physically couldn't. On the defensive end, we eat shot clock and force opponents into late-clock possessions. On the offensive end, we run, generating early-clock possessions for ourselves. Their best looks happen late and rushed. Our best looks happen early and free.

Both halves of the floor are pulling in the same direction. The team that wins the early-vs-late-clock battle wins the efficiency margin without needing to win the steal or rebound battle directly.

That's the point of the 3/4-court trap: we play fast, they play slow. The trap eats their shot clock; the small-ball lineups push on the rebound. The advantage shows up in their late-clock 0.72 PPC against our early-clock looks, not in a steal column.

Why this roster fits this idea

The 26-27 roster looks built for this. Pharaoh Compton, Sean Stewart, and Bol Bowen can all credibly play the 5 in a small lineup: long, mobile, capable of rim-running. The wings (Aristode, Riley, Meadow, Jasper, Ariza) are all 6-5 to 6-8 with athletic profiles that hold up in a press. There's no body on the projected rotation who fundamentally can't move. We have 10 long athletes who can really run, so far.

Last year's team, anchored by Bittle at the 5, couldn't credibly run this as a sustained identity. This year's roster, especially in small-ball configurations, can run it as much as we want.

The tell

Good guards can beat it quickly and punish us with odd-man rushes to the basket. But if you don't see teams doing that... if they're content to swing the ball a little bit and spend 5 seconds breaking it, that means we're winning that interaction, and we should keep doing it.

Depth as a Strategy for Stars Running the math on depth vs. stars after the 25-26 collapse

Last year we built the roster around three big names. When one of them got hurt, the season fell apart. This year there are ten smaller but still Big Ten-caliber names on it, with maybe more to come. I wanted to see what the math actually says about that trade.

What happened last year

Last offseason most of the time and money went into bringing back the Big Three: Jackson Shelstad, Nate Bittle, and Kwame Evans Jr. By the end of the year, by EvanMiya, all three were high caliber. Bittle finished as the 80th-ranked player in college basketball. Evans was 167th. Shelstad, in the 724 possessions he managed before the injury, was 249th. The Big Three were mostly as advertised.

The problem was everyone else. After committing the resources up top, the backfill was a group of players who, it turned out, were not Big Ten caliber: Ege Demir, Devon Pryor, Efe Vatan, Wei Lin. None of the four are transferring up to high-major conferences this spring. The market is telling us we went into last year with only about six high-major players.

Some of that was structural. Once the program committed to bringing the Big Three back, the rest of the offseason was contingent on what they did about the NBA. All three went through the draft process, and that process dragged. The portal moved without us. We didn't know how much money we'd actually have to spend until well into the summer, by which point most of the legitimate high-major portal had been picked over. The thin backfill wasn't entirely a strategic call; it was partly what was left once the NBA answers came back.

And then Bittle got hurt, and then Shelstad got knocked out for the season, and a walk-on ended up in the starting lineup for most of conference play. Bittle and Evans were still high-major players, but there wasn't a third, fourth, or fifth rotation piece behind them with the same level. The team around them came apart.

What we did differently this spring

Shelstad and Evans walked into the portal as real top-end talents. EvanMiya has Evans as a top-ten overall portal player. 247 and On3 had Shelstad somewhere in the 10-15 range before he picked his next stop. Bittle declared for the NBA. There was a version of this offseason where we re-consolidated: spent the same money chasing top-30 names and tried again with the same structure.

Instead, the roster filled out wide. Eight names that one service or another has projected as a Big Ten-level starter (but not an all-conference level player):

Plus two rotation pieces in Jerry Easter (+1.99) and Tajh Ariza (+2.34). That's ten guys in a real rotation conversation, where last year there were six. We're reportedly still in the market: we were close on Divine Ugochukwu before he picked elsewhere, and reporting has us in the mix for Malik Ewan. Twelve is plausible.

The variance, and what it actually means

College players between 18 and 23 are noisy from one year to the next. Bodies change, roles change, schemes change. I went back and looked at EvanMiya's transfer projections across three full seasons against the actuals (about 1,900 player-seasons in the matched set) to try to put a number on the noise:

  • Mean residual = +0.5 BPR. Transfers come in roughly half a point above their projection on average. The market is slightly pessimistic, probably also accounting for injury/washout.
  • Standard deviation = ~1.65 BPR. Two-thirds of outcomes land within ±1.65 of the projection. About one-sixth land more than a full standard deviation above it.
  • Slight positive skew. Breakouts are a little more common than equally-extreme busts.
  • About a 6% complete-bust rate. Roughly one in 17 projections won't materialize at all, whether from a season-ending injury, a role failure, or a mid-year departure. The Monte Carlo applies this as a baseline floor across every player.

What the second bullet means in practical terms: if Jasper Johnson is projected at +3.7, applying the +0.5 bias and the +1.65 standard deviation gives roughly a one-in-six chance he ends up above +5.9. That's not a guarantee, and it's not even particularly likely for any one player. The downside cuts the same way: a one-in-six chance he comes in below +2.6, plus a 6% chance he completely bombs out or gets hurt and misses the whole year, contributing nothing. But if you have several +3-and-up projections on the roster, the math says you should expect at least one of them to land in that breakout range.

The NIL angle

There's also a cost-side version of this. We gave up two players ranked in the top 30 of the portal (Shelstad and Evans), both of whom sit at the steep end of the NIL price curve, where every spot of ranking adds a real chunk of money. In their place we added seven players ranked roughly between the 80th and 230th slots, where prices are flatter.

If the market is even loosely efficient, that's the trade we wanted to make at our talent level. Two top-30 buys vs. seven #80-230 buys is, roughly, the same money for many more bodies. If the curve is steeper than it looks (and most signals suggest it is), we ended up with the better deal.

What 25,000 simulations actually say

A Monte Carlo simulation, named for the Monte Carlo casino because the technique is basically rolling dice over and over, works like this: take the noise model above (each player's projection, the +0.5 bias, the ~1.65 BPR standard deviation) and sample one hypothetical "actual" BPR for every player on the roster. That gives you one plausible season for the team. Sort the ten sampled BPRs, write down the top-5 mean (the starting five) and the top-8 mean (the playing rotation), and you have one data point. Then run the whole thing 25,000 times. What you get isn't a single projection number, it's a distribution of plausible team strengths.

For comparison, I pulled the actual top-5 and top-8 means from each of the last four Oregon rosters.

One caveat before the table: this compares a simulated distribution of next year's outcomes to single realized seasons from the past. We don't know what those past rosters' Monte Carlos would have shown going into their seasons. So read these less as a clean head-to-head and more as "does the simulated band overlap or sit above the band of past outcomes."

The median outcomes for the 2027 10-player roster:

  • Top-5 starting lineup median: +5.02 BPR. Above three of the last four Oregon seasons, below the 24-25 high-water mark of +5.45.
  • Top-8 rotation median: +4.18 BPR. Just under 24-25's +4.23, close to a match for the best Oregon rotation of the last four years.
  • P(any player above +6.0 BPR) = 67%. More likely than not that someone on the 2027 roster has a real star season.
  • P(at least two players above +5.0 BPR) = 73%. Strong odds of multiple All-Big-Ten caliber pieces.
  • P(at least three players above +4.0 BPR) = 88%. Likely we have a real core of high-level rotation guys.

Odds vs. the last four Altman rosters

The question I really wanted to answer is whether the 2027 roster, built so differently, lands in the same neighborhood as the actual Oregon rosters of the last four years. I wanted to know how likely it was that our new starting lineup would be better than the last couple years, and how likely it was that our new 8-man rotation would be better than it has been the last few years.

Season Their top-5 Odds of a better 2027 top-5 Their top-8 Odds of a better 2027 top-8
22-23 missed NCAAs
Dante / Richardson / Bittle / Ware / Guerrier
+4.26 88% +3.57 83%
23-24 11-seed
Dante / Couisnard / Evans / Barthelemy / Shelstad
+4.70 69% +3.47 86%
24-25 high-water · 5-seed
Bittle / Evans / Shelstad / Barthelemy / Bamba
+5.45 25% +4.23 47%
25-26 missed NCAAs
Bittle / Evans / Shelstad (the year the depth failed)
+4.65 72% +3.08 94%

A note on the 25-26 row: Shelstad's +4.88 BPR is his per-possession rate over the 724 possessions he played before the injury. EvanMiya's metric is per-possession, so the rate stands as if he'd played the whole season. The 25-26 top-5 of +4.65 in the table is, in effect, a fully-healthy Big Three; the actual played-out season was worse. All of the odds against 25-26 in this article are against the version of last year where the Big Three stay healthy, not the version that actually happened. We're currently running at a 72% chance that we're already in better shape with the starting lineup than we were at the beginning of last season when the whole roster was healthy.

On the top-8 rotation metric, the simulation has the new roster around a coin flip against the program's best-of-the-last-four-years mark, a clear favorite vs. 22-23 and 23-24, and very likely to clear last year's broken rotation. On the top-5 lineup metric, it's a favorite over three of the four prior teams. The exception is 24-25, where Bittle, Evans, Shelstad, Barthelemy, and Bamba all turned in 4+ BPR seasons in the same year: a hard outcome to replicate at the front of the roster.

The 25-26 row is the one worth sitting with. Last year's top-5 still cleared +4.65, because Bittle, Evans, and Shelstad were real players. That team was never that good. We were never at full health, and we played most of the season severely diminished. But this exercise is about roster construction. We don't penalize for last year's injuries, and we model this year's risk by saying that each player has a 6% chance of not making it. Getting as close to apples-to-apples as we can with this data. We're comparing where we stand this summer to where we stood last summer.

What each commitment actually bought us

Another way I wanted to look at this is in the order the commitments actually came in: what each new signing, as the spring rolled out, did to the simulated odds of beating last year's top-5 of +4.65. (Setting aside our incoming HS freshman Seven Spurlock, who's on the roster but doesn't project as a top-ten rotation piece yet.)

# Last commit Top-5 Odds vs. 25-26
5Andrew Meadow+3.4010%
6Jasper Johnson+4.1927%
7Jerry Easter+4.3232%
8Taylor Bol Bowen+4.5644%
9Fred Payne+4.7355%
10Dwayne Aristode+5.0272%
11hypothetical +3.0 add+5.1377%
12hypothetical +3.0 add+5.2282%

The order the commits came in: Ariza first, Stewart deciding to return, Riley, Compton, then Meadow rounding out the first five. At that point the simulation has us at 10% against last year's top-5. Five commits in, the math said we still had work to do.

Jasper Johnson commits over from Kentucky and the odds jump to 27%. Easter to 32%. Bol Bowen to 44%. Payne is the one that pushes it past 50/50, to 55%. Aristode coming in late as the highest-projected single signing of the spring is the largest single move: 55% to 72%.

The reporting says we're not done. If we land one more rotation-caliber transfer in the Malik Ewan tier (call it a +3.0 BPR projection), the simulation moves to 77%. A second one of those would put us at 82%. That gets us close to where adding more transfers stops materially changing the odds.

Most of the lift up to ten is real new value, not just depth bookkeeping. It makes for good copy and good narratives to project a starting lineup and pretend we know how these players' futures are going to go. We don't. What landing this "depth" of B1G-starter quality really gets us is more chances for good players to break out, launch up to the next level, and carry a team in '27.

Where this lands

The thing that really jumped out running this: the expected average of our top-5 (+5.02) is higher than the projection of any single player on the roster. Compton is +4.34. Aristode is +4.30. The simulated top-5 mean of the whole roster lands above both of them. That's the bites-at-the-apple effect in numbers. We sample ten noisy projections, take the best five, and the average of those five lifts above any individual's ceiling. I knew the effect would be real. I didn't expect it to be that big.

The same idea hits harder when you set Shelstad's 25-26 as the bar. Every name on this roster is projected as worse than Shelstad was last year. Compton's +4.34 is the highest, Shelstad finished at +4.88. By the static projections alone, every individual on this team is worse than the player that we let walk out the door. That's not how it ends up. With ten projections and 1.65 BPR of year-over-year noise per player, the math says the expected number of guys who reach or beat Shelstad's mark is 2.54. The probability of at least one is 95%. Three or more is roughly a coin flip. We just don't know which guys they'll be yet.

And we were already a coin-flip favorite to beat last year's healthy-Big-Three starting five before Aristode signed. After nine commits (no Aristode), the simulation had us at 55% against 25-26's +4.65. Aristode pushed it to 72%. The depth had done most of the work first.

What the simulation says, roughly: the 2027 roster is favored against three of the last four Oregon teams and around a coin flip against the best of them. None of that is a guarantee. The 5th percentile of the simulation is a real outcome too, and at that level we'd be a worse team than 25-26 on the rotation metric. But the median sits well above last year on both top-5 and top-8, and that's the part that wasn't there before.

Methodology: per-player Monte Carlo, 25,000 sims. Calibrated against 1,872 EvanMiya transfer projections from 23-24 to 25-26. +0.5 BPR bias on the projection mean, σ ~1.4-1.8 by projection bucket, with a 6% injury-rate floor applied to every player. Returners get half the bias and a tighter σ; freshmen get a wider σ to reflect the absence of college tape. Player outcomes are sampled independently, so the simulated variance is probably a bit tight (real BPR has shared team-context).

Roster

14 players · sorted by projected BPR ·

Player Class Ht Position Prior School Status OBPR DBPR BPR
Pharaoh Compton JR 6-8 Big San Diego State Transfer +2.18 +2.15 +4.34
Dwayne Aristode SO 6-8 Wing F Arizona Transfer +2.94 +1.37 +4.30
Sean Stewart SR 6-9 Big Oregon Returner +1.17 +2.70 +3.87
Tyrone Riley IV JR 6-6 Wing San Francisco Transfer +2.56 +1.29 +3.85
Jasper Johnson SO 6-5 Combo G Kentucky Transfer +2.91 +0.83 +3.74
Taylor Bol Bowen SR 6-10 Big Alabama Transfer +0.74 +2.33 +3.08
Fred Payne SR 6-1 Combo G Boston College Transfer +1.95 +1.08 +3.02
Andrew Meadow SR 6-7 Wing Boise State Transfer +2.38 −0.01 +2.37
Tajh Ariza FR 6-7 Wing HS Newcomer +0.96 +1.38 +2.34
Jerry Easter II SO 6-5 Combo G USC Transfer +0.68 +1.30 +1.99
Seven Spurlock FR 6-3 Wing HS Newcomer +0.13 +0.39 +0.52
Kendre Harrison FR 6-8 Tight End HS Newcomer −0.13 +0.49 +0.37
Rian Gonzales FR Oregon Returner +0.07 −0.08 −0.01
Luke Johnson SO Oregon Returner −1.01 −0.63 −1.64

BPR = EvanMiya Bayesian Performance Rating projection for 2026-27. Class is heading into the season. Heights from Bart Torvik for transfers, listed-recruit numbers for freshmen.

Player Breakdowns

Click to expand. Stats via Hoop-Explorer.

Pharaoh Compton JR · 6-8 · Big · San Diego State · BPR +4.34

One of the players I'd specifically hoped we'd target going into portal season, and probably the player I'm most excited about on this roster. Listed at 6-8/6-9 with a reported wingspan around 7-3. Build is closer to Draymond Green than a traditional five, long, mobile, athletic enough to play forward, but with the wingspan to defend centers at the college level. The kind of body and motor you build a team around.

Representative highlights: watch the way he gets a body on his man and rolls.

Why his numbers don't tell the full story

At SDSU last season, the 2nd unit was arguably better than the 1st … Compton, Davis, and a couple of freshmen put up wildly better per-minute numbers than the starters … and the staff just never made the swap. Compton played about 15 minutes a night the whole year, which means his per-minute production is sky-high but his career start total sits at one. The hope is that he can keep up that per-minute production with a much bigger role at Oregon. There are real indications that he can, but no guarantees, and a fair share of foul trouble to navigate before we find out (more on that below).

The shot chart is hilarious

Compton 25-26 shot chart from Hoop-Explorer: a giant green circle right at the rim, almost no attempts anywhere else
Compton's 25-26 shot chart (Hoop-Explorer). One giant green circle at the rim, and that's it. He doesn't try to take anything that isn't a layup or a dunk.

How elite is the rim finishing? 82% at the rim. #1 in all of college basketball among any player with at least 100 rim attempts. There is literally no one who had more rim attempts than Compton and also converted at a higher rate. Drop the gate to 50 rim attempts and he's #6. Out of 2,000 players. His FTR of 52.4 is reminiscent of Kwame Evans Jr.: same kind of constantly-drawing-fouls, downhill-pressure value player. Take Kwame's profile and replace the three-point shooting with elite rim finishing; that's roughly the comp.

Where his offense actually comes from

Hoop-Explorer's play-type frequencies show a player with zero perimeter game and elite efficiency on everything around the basket. The numbers are off the charts:

Compton 25-26 play type frequencies: 99th percentile efficiency on Big Cut & Roll and Transition, near-zero on perimeter actions
Hoop-Explorer 25-26 play-type frequencies. Note the empty bars on Rim Attack, Attack & Kick, Perimeter Sniper, Dribble Jumper, Mid-Range, Hits Cutter, Perimeter Cut, and PnR Passer. He literally did not register a single possession in any of those categories.
  • Big Pick-and-Roll: 1.49 PPP, 98.7th percentile, used 6.8 times per 100 possessions (top decile of frequency). He's strictly the catch-and-finish roll man … not a ball-handler … but when he gets a shoulder past his man and rolls, he's essentially unguardable. Oregon has run high pick-and-roll as a featured action for years (the Couisnard / N'Faly Dante action is the recent template). Compton plays the Dante role with better finishing.
  • Transition: 1.64 PPP, 98.9th percentile. He runs like a forward, beats his man down the floor almost every time, and dunks anything he can get a shoulder on. I cannot remember seeing a big who finishes in transition this often.
  • Rebounding & scramble: 1.41 PPP, 84.9th percentile, and the frequency (3.1 per 100 possessions) is high too. He gets to scramble situations a ton because his offensive rebounding rate is high. When he gets one, he dunks it or finishes with feel.
  • Post-up: 0.88 PPP, 67.9th percentile. Not what you call him for, but if the matchup's there he doesn't waste it.
  • Pick & pop / high-low: Essentially zero. He doesn't shoot, so this isn't a tool yet.

The three bars worth staring at … Big Cut & Roll, Rebounding & Scramble, and Transition … are all ridiculously high in both efficiency and frequency. He finishes the pick-and-roll, he finishes second-chance offense, and he finishes in transition. That last one in particular is unusual at this volume for a center.

Lefty PnR note: when the screener and the ball-handler are opposite-handed, the action attacks both sides of the rim simultaneously, each player driving to their dominant hand. Compton being a lefty sets up best with right-handed lead guards, but most of Oregon's backcourt is also left-handed (Jasper Johnson and Fred Payne both shoot lefty). The opposite-hand pairings to watch are Compton + Jerry Easter and possibly Compton + Andrew Meadow; those are the only right-handed initiators on the roster who could run that action. Easter-Compton specifically is a really interesting PnR combination. Sneaky third option: Compton + Aristode. It might never happen since Aristode hasn't been a primary handler, but if his on-ball game expands at all, he's another righty who could run the lefty-PnR action with Compton.

What he does well

  • Elite finisher at the rim. ~74% from 2, almost all at the basket. Dunks anything he can get a shoulder on.
  • Roll man. One of the better PnR rollers in college. Sets great screens, gets a shoulder past your hip, finishes through contact. Lefty, plays even bigger.
  • Switchable. 6-8 + 7-3 wingspan + real lateral feet means he can guard 1-5 in the right matchups. Defends collegiate centers despite the listed height.
  • Rim protection & offensive rebounding. 8.9% Blk, 9.9% ORB. Real shot-deterrent presence + second-chance points.

What he can't do… yet

  • No floor stretching. Doesn't shoot from outside (1.6% 3PR, 0 makes). Strictly an at-the-rim scorer right now.
  • FT shooting is fine, not great. 64% as a soph, up from a rough freshman number. For someone in this role, that's actually a fine number. You'd like it higher, but it's not a problem.
  • Fouls a lot. PFR 7.2 is high. Hard to keep him on the floor; he can't be your 35-minute-a-night five. Need a real backup at the 5 to absorb the foul-trouble stretches. As a 22-26 minute high-impact piece: perfect. As an iron-man five: no. Important context: he doesn't profile as your crunch-time closer anyway (FT% is too low for the last two minutes), so an earlier foul-out isn't catastrophic the way it would be for a different kind of player. Something to improve, not disqualifying.

The defensive fit is a perfect match

Defensively, Compton is everything you'd design in a lab for an Altman press-and-switch matchup zone five: undersized for the position but long, switchable, rim-protecting, and constantly active. Oregon has been here before with this exact archetype: Jordan Bell, Chris Boucher, Francis Okoro, LJ Figueroa. Undersized, long-armed, athletic guys playing the 5. Every time, it's worked.

Schematic head-start

The matchup zone is genuinely rare in college basketball … almost nobody plays it … so most transfers arrive at Oregon starting from zero on scheme. Compton is the exception. SDSU runs a hybrid man-zone system with a lot of matchup principles, so a lot of what Oregon will ask of him defensively is already familiar. Another reason SDSU has been a productive school to target.

Fit at Oregon

Drops in behind Stewart at the 5 to start. Compton and Stewart have overlapping skillsets … both elite finishers without individual offensive creation, both at-the-rim-only on offense … so they likely don't share the floor much. The pairings with real spacing are Compton next to Bol Bowen, or Compton at the 5 with Aristode at the 4.

Prediction

By February or March, the team's best lineup probably ends up being:

Payne · Riley · Aristode · Compton + (Meadow or Jasper)

Four shooters around Compton. That's the version of this roster that maximizes his ability to roll, finish, and crash the glass.

Dwayne Aristode SO · 6-8 · Wing F · Arizona · BPR +4.30

How does a Dutch kid end up named Dwayne? You get there when his dad names you after Dwyane Wade. Aristode grew up in the Netherlands (Lelystad), spent his youth on the Dutch national team pipeline, and moved to the U.S. for prep school at Brewster Academy. By the end of his junior year he was a top-25 recruit nationally and committed to Arizona.

Representative highlights: the easy stroke from deep, the rim runs in transition, the build.

The senior-year wipeout

He missed his entire senior year of high school with a lower-leg injury (interestingly, the same kind of thing that sidelined Motiejus Krivas at Arizona). So his arrival in Tucson last fall was effectively cold: no senior tape, a year removed from competitive basketball, just a high-end recruiting profile and the Brewster body of work.

What he was at Arizona

Aristode played about 12 minutes a game as a freshman, a clear seventh-man role splitting wing minutes behind Ivan Kharchenkov. Arizona finished 36-3, was the #1 team in the country for a long stretch, and the on-off splits matter here:

On-off, Arizona 25-26

The Wildcats were a slightly better offensive team and a slightly better defensive team in Aristode's minutes than out of them. As a freshman, post-injury, on the #1 team in the country; he made his team better on both ends. That's the kind of indicator that doesn't show up in a 12-minute box score.

His on-court role was narrow but extreme: floor spacer + offensive-rebound follow guy. Catch-and-shoot at high frequency, dunk anything that came at the rim, crash the offensive glass and finish above it. Honest read: this was the totality of his offensive contribution. Almost no shot creation. Almost no on-ball reps. Tommy Lloyd's offense at Arizona is a Mark-Few-Gonzaga descendant … double-post, ball-through-the-elbow stuff … so Aristode was deployed almost exclusively at the 3 even though his frame would work at the 4.

The traits

The athletic ability is breathtaking. He plays above the rim effortlessly. The shot has infinite range with a quick, relaxed stroke, feet set, easy release, doesn't need a ton of space or runway. The catch-and-shoot three is unequivocally there. The off-the-bounce version is rougher; the form falls apart a bit when he has to dribble into it. So today he's a real catch-and-shoot weapon, not yet a dribble-pull-up shooter. Body: 6-8, 215-220, stacked, built like he's been doing this since he was twelve.

The shot chart is exactly what you want to see

Aristode 25-26 shot chart from Hoop-Explorer: almost all attempts are at the rim or behind the three-point arc, with no midrange
Aristode's 25-26 shot chart (Hoop-Explorer). Modern basketball to a tee: dunks and threes, with the entire midrange ignored. That's how you stay efficient.

Look at the diet: heavy three-point volume from above-the-break and both wings, finishes at the rim, and almost nothing in the midrange. He shot 46% from three last year, which is unsustainable, but EvanMiya projects him at about 36% from three next year, which is perfectly fine. The touch is real; the volume is the swing factor. Free throws were 50%, but only on 20 attempts all season … about once every three games … so that number isn't his actual ability. It's a non-sample.

Where his offense actually came from

Aristode 25-26 play type frequencies: perimeter sniper at 99.3 percentile, surprising frequency on PnR passer, very few rim attacks
Aristode's 25-26 Hoop-Explorer play types. The Perimeter Sniper bar is the eye-catcher; the PnR Passer bar is the surprise.
  • Perimeter Sniper: 1.40 PPP, 99.3rd percentile, 5.9 per 100. When you kicked it to him on the wing, you got 1.40 points every time. Astronomical numbers, not sustainable at higher usage, but the form and the touch are absolutely real.
  • PnR Passer: 1.04 PPP, 62.9th percentile, 2.1 per 100. The interesting bar. Both the frequency and efficiency are unexpected from a 6-8 wing. There's something there as a connector in PnR, especially with a real roller like Compton or Stewart.
  • Transition: 1.44 PPP, 88.3rd percentile. Runs the floor like a forward, finishes above the rim.
  • Rim Attack: 0.48 PPP, 1.6th percentile, 1.4 per 100. This is the bar that breaks the modern-shot-chart narrative, given how athletic he is, you'd expect more, and better. Either the role didn't ask for it or his self-creation off the bounce isn't there yet.
  • Mid-Range / Dribble Jumper: Basically zero. Took maybe one dribble jumper all year (and made it). No mid-range game at all.
  • Big Cut & Roll, Hits Cutter, Inside Out, Pick & Pop, High-Low: Zero possessions.

The connector role and the scaling question

Aristode's usage at Arizona was 12%, the 3rd percentile. He floated around the offense, did almost only good things, and almost never did bad things. The ball didn't stop with him; he kept it moving.

  • Effective FG%: 30th-highest in all of college basketball, on this usage. There's no way that holds if usage climbs to 20-25%.
  • Offensive Rating: 50th-highest in college basketball, same caveat.
  • 3PR: 67% of his shots were threes. That diet is the floor of the modern game.

The honest tension: every rate stat he posted is genuinely elite, and every rate stat is also dependent on him being a connector piece between Jaden Bradley, Motiejus Krivas, and the Arizona starting unit. Going from a 7th-man kick-out target on a 36-3 team to a featured rotation piece on a top-25 team is a real role change, and we don't have college tape of him in that bigger role.

What he looks like with a bigger role: Netherlands U16

For the 2022 FIBA U16 European Championship he averaged 15.3 PPG · 9.0 RPG · 3.1 APG · 2.0 SPG · 1.3 BPG over 7 games for the Netherlands. Career highs for him at that tournament: 25 points (vs Poland, on his 16th birthday), 13 rebounds (vs Croatia), 5 assists (vs Israel), 5 blocks (vs Lithuania). That's a do-everything stat line at a high-level international tournament, very different from the floor-spacer-only role at Arizona. He briefly joined the Dutch men's national team in summer 2024 too. The do-it-all reps exist; they just haven't shown up in college yet.

FT%: the projection feels low

EvanMiya projects him at 62% from the line for next year, anchored to his Arizona 50%. But Arizona was a non-sample (10-of-20 all season, about one trip every three games). MaxPreps lists his Brewster Academy FT% from his healthy junior year (three years ago) at 78%; that's the more meaningful reference point. Combined with the 99th-percentile catch-and-shoot stroke, the actual FT ability is almost certainly higher than 62%. He can shoot the ball.

The eye test and the counting stats don't quite match

The film shows an obviously dominant defensive player and a high-end athlete. The on-off numbers back it up; team is better with him on the floor on both ends. But the traditional rate stats don't pop the way you'd expect from a guy who's clearly killing people on tape:

  • ORB%: 5.5, modest for a 6-8 vertical athlete
  • DRB%: 8.4, low
  • Blk%: 0.7, very low for the frame
  • Stl%: 2.0, fine, not high

So the rate stats lie a little. He's a better player than the box score suggests, and the team-impact numbers reinforce that. But the honest read: you'd like to see him be more aggressive at attacking those counting stats: more boards, more steals, more blocks. It's a moderate concern that those numbers haven't shown up yet, and an open question whether they ever will.

What he does well

  • Elite floor spacing. 99.3rd percentile as a perimeter sniper at 1.40 PPP. Easy stroke, infinite range, fast trigger off the catch.
  • Vertical athleticism. Plays above the rim. Finishes in transition (88th percentile) and crashes the offensive glass with real bounce.
  • Connecting passing. 62.9th percentile PnR passer at 6-8 is a real find. Ball moves through him, he doesn't stall it.
  • Plus-impact splits. A 36-3 team being slightly better on both ends in his minutes, as a freshman, post-injury, is a genuine signal.
  • Defense. 6-8, 215-220, easy mover, switchable 2-4. Can play high or low in the matchup zone, can guard man, can guard up. The "D" in 3-and-D is fully there; it's why NBA scouts are drooling.

What we don't know yet

  • Can he attack the rim? 1.6th percentile in Rim Attack is striking for a 6-8/220 vertical athlete. Either Arizona didn't ask for it, or his self-creation off the bounce isn't there yet. The U16 tape says he can; the college tape doesn't yet.
  • How does the game scale with usage? 12% USG to 20-25% is a real jump. The 46% from three and the 30th-best eFG won't hold; the question is how gracefully they regress.
  • Only one year of college tape. Senior year of high school was wiped out by injury, so we have a single healthy freshman season to project from. Sample is small.

Fit at Oregon

The initial pitch out of the staff is that he backs up Sean Stewart at the 4 to start the season. It would surprise exactly no one if he ends up in the starting lineup before long, particularly if the on-ball game expands at all. The Kwame-Evans-style role at the 4 (stretch four next to Compton or Stewart, switch everything, attack closeouts) is the obvious fit, and slotting him up to the 3 in bigger lineups is also viable.

Two things to remember when calibrating expectations:

  1. You never know what happens when you ask a passive freshman to run a bigger role. The numbers might not just scale; they might change shape. He's been so passive at Arizona that there's no real college tape of him in a featured spot. The ramp could be uneven.
  2. He doesn't have to develop much more to be a real player. If he just does at Oregon what he did at Arizona … same role, same impact … over twice the minutes, he projects as a 3-and-D NBA wing on athletic profile alone. The upside, if the creation game scales, is meaningfully higher.

This is the highest NBA upside Oregon has had on the roster in a long time. High-floor, high-ceiling addition.

The point that gets buried

The 3-point shooting is what's getting the headlines: the 99th-percentile sniper number, the 46% from deep. But it's the defensive potential that's actually unbelievable. The way he moves at 6-8/220, the way he can shut a possession down, the matchup-zone fit, the switchability across 2 through 4. That's the part that turns him into a real player at the next level.

Sean Stewart SR · 6-9 · Big · Returning · BPR +3.87

McDonald's All-American, McDonald's All-American Game dunk champion, and the only returner on this roster. Stewart's the senior voice in the locker room and the most explosive vertical athlete on the team.

The path here

Three schools in three years: Duke (FR), Ohio State (SO), Oregon (JR). At Duke he barely played. At Ohio State he started all 30 games at center despite being 6-8, sharing a frontcourt rotation with fellow McDonald's All-American Aaron Bradshaw. Stewart was clearly the better of the two and a real defensive presence in the middle for OSU. Whatever Bradshaw was supposed to be, Stewart actually was.

Why his Oregon year didn't meet expectations

Stewart's projection coming into 25-26 was significant; the models loved him; we were excited. He didn't hit those numbers, and the cleanest explanation is positional misuse. Oregon's wing depth collapsed last year … especially after Jackson Shelstad got hurt … and the only way to get the team's best players on the floor was to slide Stewart down to the 3. That doesn't work, because he can't shoot. The Stewart-Evans-Bittle frontline (with Stewart at the 3) got annihilated in conference play. He was on the floor, just out of position.

When he was used correctly, the numbers were good

The on-off splits when Stewart played the 4 (replacing Kwame Evans next to Bittle) or the 5 (replacing Bittle next to Evans) tell a different story; Oregon played really well in those minutes. He was about a half-tick below Bittle's level at the 5 and Evans's at the 4, but a half-tick below those guys is genuinely good. The Ohio State year shows the same thing: as a real frontcourt piece, he's a positive player.

The vertical athleticism is unique on this team

You have to go back to Jordan Bell or Kenny Wooten to find an Oregon player with this kind of pure vertical pop. Sadly he doesn't have the length or defensive timing of those two, but he's an explosive runner, beats his check down the floor consistently, and switches onto guards without panic. That last piece … being able to roll out a starting five where any defender can be on a point guard … is a real advantage and opens up a lot of options for Altman defensively.

What he does well

  • Vertical athleticism. McDonald's All-American Game dunk champ. Best vertical on the team. Rolls and finishes above the rim.
  • Switchable defense. 6-9/220, real lateral feet. Can guard 1-5 in the right matchups. The kind of versatility this team is built around.
  • Active off-ball. Crashes the offensive glass, runs the floor, makes second-chance plays. High-motor, high-effort.
  • Real defensive impact at the 4 or 5. The OSU starting-5 sample and the Oregon-without-Bittle minutes both show a positive defensive piece in his actual position.

What he can't do

  • He can't shoot. Anything more than 3-4 feet is an adventure. FT% has hovered around 50% across multiple years; this is not a small sample.
  • Handle is shaky. Turnover rate is through the roof. He's not a player you want with the ball more than two dribbles at a time.
  • Post-ups don't work either. Oregon experimented with set plays for him last year. The numbers don't support feeding him in the post or putting offense in his hands.
  • Cannot play the 3. Already proven last year. The lack of shooting makes the spacing math unworkable.

The intangibles

He's the best recruiter on this team. After he chose to come back, he turned into Oregon's number-one ambassador, chasing portal targets on social media, making guys feel welcome, doing real off-court work that helped land this incoming class. He's the only returner, the senior voice, and the one player on the roster who already knows how Altman wants things done. That role matters in ways that don't show up in BPR.

The shot chart

Sean Stewart shot chart, 2025-26 Oregon
Stewart's shot distribution at Oregon last year. Way too much volume in the midrange and short floater area for a player whose game is at the rim.

The rim cluster is fantastic, 67% at the rim, on real volume, with a 4.6% block rate on the other end. That's the player. The problem is the rest of the chart. He has no business shooting from anywhere outside the painted area, and yet there are scattered midrange and elbow attempts everywhere. He needs to be dunking the ball or passing it. Anything between the restricted area and the three-point line is a possession-killer.

Where his offense came from

Sean Stewart play type breakdown, 2025-26 Oregon
Stewart's offensive play types at Oregon. Red bars on basically every creator-side touch: Big Cut & Roll, Post-Up, High-Low all in the 28-30th percentile.

It is not a mystery. Almost every bar on this chart that involves a real decision comes out red. He's not a particularly good half-court offensive player, not as a roll man, not on post-ups, not on high-low entries. The one bright spot is transition. The biggest takeaway is the huge bar at High-Low: that was Stewart, classified as a big but slid down to the 3, throwing the ball to Bittle and Evans in the post. The three of them were essentially the entire offense once Shelstad went down, so they ended up on the floor together a lot. The volume was forced by lineup necessity. The efficiency was 30th percentile.

The bar-by-bar:

  • Post-Up: 0.74 PPP, 28.0th percentile, 5.1 per 100. The most-used play type. Oregon ran offense to him on the block. The numbers say don't.
  • Big Cut & Roll (roll man): 1.07 PPP, 29.5th percentile, 3.6 per 100. Mid-volume, bottom-third efficiency; he's not making things hard on a defense as a roller.
  • High-Low: 0.98 PPP, 30.0th percentile, 2.1 per 100. The forced-volume bar, high frequency for a player at this position, low efficiency. This is the "Stewart at the 3 throwing to Bittle/Evans" minutes.
  • Inside-Out: 0.95 PPP, 46.4th percentile, 2.9 per 100. Middling. Better in his Ohio State year, but at Oregon it was only OK.
  • Reb. & Scramble: 1.19 PPP, 49.0th percentile, 2.7 per 100. Live-ball plays off offensive boards; this is where he should be living.
  • Transition: 1.27 PPP, 60.8th percentile, 1.9 per 100. Beats his check down the floor. This is real.
  • Hits Cutter: 1.07 PPP, 62.5th percentile, 1.1 per 100. Decent. Reading the floor and finding cutters works.
  • Rim Attack (self-created): 0.77 PPP, 31.0th percentile, 1.0 per 100. He's not getting his own at the rim; he gets his rim shots off rolls and rebounds, not on his own.

The shape: anything where Stewart is the offensive engine (post, roll, high-low entry, self-created rim) comes out below the 35th percentile. Anything where he's a finisher off other people's work (transition, cutter touches, scramble) is around or above league average. Take the ball out of his hands; let him run the floor and crash the glass; the offense lives somewhere else.

The rebounding is special

This is where he separates from almost every other big in the country. Offensive rebound rate of 10.5%; that is unbelievably good. Defensive rebound rate of 26% is tied for around the 30th-highest in all of college basketball. He rebounds like a demon, on both ends, and that has enormous value.

The 50% free throw line is a real number

Three straight years at the line: 50% / 52% / 50%. That is not a sample-size fluke or a freshman who hasn't figured it out; that's three years of remarkably consistent data points telling you the same thing. Unlike Aristode, where I think the 50% is hiding a much better shooter underneath, with Stewart what you see is what you get. Don't put him at the line in a tight game and don't expect any range expansion from here.

The usage numbers don't fit the skill set

Layering all of last year's usage data:

  • Usage 18%, far too high for what he's good at. With this team's offensive options, he should be in the 12-14% range as a pure finisher.
  • Turnover rate 18%, really high. Direct consequence of asking him to handle and pass and post.
  • Assist rate 6%, fine for a big. He's not a creator, but he's not a black hole either.
  • Steal rate 2.2%, good for a 6-9 frontcourt player.

He's a possession factory

There are two ways to win basketball games: shoot at a higher percentage than the other team, or take more shots than the other team. Stewart is not the first kind of player. He is emphatically the second kind. 10.5% offensive rebound rate. 4.6% block rate. 2.2% steal rate. When he's on the floor, your team is going to take more shots than the other team; period. That is a winning trait, full stop. He's a winning basketball player. We just need to play him correctly. Take the ball out of his hands, point him at the rim and the glass, and let the seven other guys on this roster do the shooting. He'll be a lot better in 2026-27 than he was in 2025-26.

Fit at Oregon

The simplest path to a much better Stewart year: play him exclusively at the 4 and the 5. Don't ask him to space the floor. Don't run sets through him. Let him be a focal point of the defense and a focal point of the dunking, and let the offense come from the seven other guys who can shoot. With Compton, Bol Bowen, and Aristode all in the frontcourt rotation, Oregon shouldn't have last year's positional emergencies forcing him out of position.

If he's used correctly, expect him to be substantially better than he was last year. The talent and the impact at his real position both check out. The only question is whether the team's lineup needs let him stay there.

Tyrone Riley IV JR · 6-6 · Wing · San Francisco · BPR +3.85

A long, lefty wing who caught NBA scouts' attention a couple of games into his freshman year. He's around 6-6 and just moves different, the kind of fluid mover you expect from a pro, not a kid playing his first college season. His tape jumped off the screen.

Riley's best game from his sophomore season at San Francisco, the version of him that had every NBA scout circling.

The story so far

After Riley's freshman year, the world came after him in the portal. Tons of high-major programs … including Oregon … got involved. For unclear reasons, he went back to San Francisco for his sophomore year, and the expectation around college basketball was that USF would run their offense through him: develop the creation, develop the passing, build the kind of NBA tape he needed to show to take a real leap.

That's not what happened. USF instead built their offense around Robbie Beasley (now at Washington) and David Fuchs … both with below-average athleticism … and Riley got slotted into a catch-and-shoot role on the wing. Midrange jumpers, perimeter sniping, taking what others created off the dribble. The freshman-to-sophomore leap that scouts were waiting for didn't happen. He didn't play poorly … he started every game both years (65 starts in 65 games) and was steady production … but his star has fallen substantially from where it was a year ago.

The usage numbers tell the whole story

Riley was the best player on that USF team by a country mile, and he had the lowest usage rate of the three USF players who got the ball: Fuchs at 29%, Beasley at 22%, Riley at 18%. For a frame of reference, 18% is around the usage of Sean Stewart or Dezdrick Lindsay on Oregon last year, not Kwame Evans, Nate Bittle, or Jackson Shelstad. The most talented player on the floor was a tertiary option in his own offense.

Multiple evaluators have framed Oregon's pursuit as an exceptional bounce-back / buy-low opportunity: a player whose stock dropped through no fault of his own, slotted now into a system that should let his actual game come back out.

Why Oregon went after him so hard

Riley was Oregon's first portal target out of the gate, not on a list, but the lead move. The offer was big enough to blow past everybody, including Louisville, who's been spending on every available portal name they like. The fact that Oregon moved that fast and that aggressively says two things:

  1. The staff still believes in the freshman-year ceiling, the version that had every NBA scout circling.
  2. They're going to use him completely differently than USF did. Catch-and-shoot wing isn't the role; that's not what the NBA needs to see, and it's not what gets the next leap. Oregon is selling him on creation reps: off the bounce, getting his own looks, generating shots for teammates. The exact film he needs to put on tape.

He can shoot from everywhere

Tyrone Riley IV shot chart from Hoop-Explorer: green hexes scattered across the entire half court, including the midrange and three-point line
Riley's 25-26 shot chart (Hoop-Explorer). His freshman year looked like a textbook 3s-and-rim diet; his sophomore year added a heavy midrange game.

Basketball is a relatively solved game; the modern recipe is shoot threes or shoot at the rim, and that's what Riley's freshman shot chart looked like. As a sophomore he took a lot more midrange. He made them at a fine clip, but those are inherently low-efficiency shots and you'd rather see fewer of them in his mix. Where he is unambiguously good: he can shoot from everywhere.

  • 3PT: 37%, real and useable
  • 2-pt midrange: 48%, high efficiency given the shot type
  • At the rim: 60%, solid for a wing
  • FT: 71%, fine but not the indicator of a future 40%+ shooter

Mechanically, the shot looks great: lefty with a quick trigger, a high release point, real verticality. Combine that with 6-6 and plus athleticism and he can get it off over almost anyone. That's exactly the physical profile USF leaned into to use him as a perimeter sniper; physically, the role made sense. It just wasn't the ceiling. Worth noting: he and Jasper Johnson are physically very similar players. Oregon got two of this archetype.

Pattern across the roster

Oregon collects lefties. Riley, Payne, Compton, and Jasper Johnson are all lefties, and that's not an accident. Altman did the same thing with the De'Vion Harmon / Jacob Young / Eric Williams Jr. teams. The reason: lefties play 2-3 inches bigger than they are. On defense, you get to guard their dribble hand with your dominant hand and contest their shot with your dominant hand. Reverse the matchup and most college players just aren't used to playing against a lefty; the rhythms feel weird. So 6-6 Riley defends like 6-7 or 6-8.

Good at everything. Just didn't do enough of it. Criminally low usage.

Tyrone Riley IV play type frequencies from Hoop-Explorer: he's efficient across most categories but with low frequency in everything except midrange
Riley's 25-26 Hoop-Explorer play-type chart. Almost every action is in the 60th-90th percentile of efficiency, but the frequencies are mid-range to low; USF didn't build their offense around him.
  • Rim Attack: 0.95 PPP, 77.7th percentile, but only 4.6 per 100. He's good when he goes; he just didn't go very often.
  • Attack & Kick: 1.03 PPP, 73rd percentile, same story, low frequency.
  • Mid-Range: 0.94 PPP, 89th percentile and 2.6 per 100. The most-used action in his game, and an inherently low-efficiency shot type. Wish there were less of this.
  • Reb. & Scramble: 1.50 PPP, 91.6th percentile. Elite when he gets one. 5% offensive rebounding rate is excellent for a guard.
  • Big Cut & Roll, Post-Up, Inside Out, Pick & Pop, High-Low: Zero possessions. He never set a screen. Worth experimenting with at Oregon; he's got the size and the touch.
  • Transition: 1.21 PPP, 46.6th percentile. Lower than you'd expect for a long, athletic wing, room to grow here.

The thing that jumps out: most of these bars are 40th-60th percentile frequency. For a player of Riley's caliber on a mid-major roster, those bars should be through the roof. USF just didn't run anything through him.

Ball security and assist trajectory

Two stats that stand out positively and one that doesn't:

  • Turnover rate: 9%. Roughly 120th in all of college basketball among ranked players. He simply does not turn the ball over.
  • Assist rate climbed slightly: 6% as a freshman to 8% as a sophomore. Pre-season scouting reports wanted that number to jump into the 20s. It didn't, not because he can't pass, but because USF didn't run actions through him.
  • Offensive rebounding 5%: elite for a guard, fine for a forward.

What he does well

  • Lefty wing fluidity. Long, smooth, plus athleticism. The pro mover the freshman tape promised.
  • Started 65 of 65 games. Two years of full-time, mid-major-tier production. Real on-ball reps even when the role didn't ask for creation.
  • Catch-and-shoot polish. Whatever USF reduced him to, he did it; the shooting and the off-ball spacing are real and translate immediately.

What he hasn't shown yet

  • The freshman-to-sophomore leap. The creation development that scouts expected didn't happen. Until he actually does it on the floor for Oregon, it's still a projection, not a result.
  • Pick-and-roll creation. USF didn't run actions through him. There's no two-year sample of him as a primary handler at this level.
  • Star tape. If he's a future pro, the next few months at Oregon need to actually look like that. The runway is shorter than it was a year ago.

The downside risk

It's also perfectly possible the freshman-to-sophomore jump never came because Riley just isn't that type of player, that he flashes but doesn't have the stuff to expand those flashes into regular, scaled contributions. Lots of guys flash and don't make it. He could end up a wallflower-type contributor: good, useful, but not the all-conference, build-your-team-around, NBA-track talent that the freshman tape suggested.

My read leans the other way: he was meaningfully more efficient than either Beasley or Fuchs on the actions USF preferred (pick-and-roll with the point, dumps to the post), and his individual production on the things he did do (rim attack, attack-and-kick, perimeter shooting) all sat in the 70th-90th percentile. That doesn't read as a guy without the stuff; that reads as a guy whose strengths didn't fit USF's preferred initiation routes.

But the downside is real. Oregon has made a substantial bet that the freshman ceiling is the real player. Altman has historically been good at identifying which mid-major-buried wings have the next-level gear, but no portal evaluation is ever a sure thing.

Fit at Oregon

Likely starts at the wing in the opening five (Payne / Riley / Meadow / Bol Bowen / Stewart). The role we sold him on, and the role he needs for his own NBA case, is bigger than the catch-and-shoot version USF used: more on-ball reps, more pick-and-roll initiation, more secondary creation. If that bet pays off, Riley is a top-3 player on this roster and quietly the most important non-Compton storyline of the season. If it doesn't, he's still a high-end wing starter on a deep team, a reasonable floor.

Two open questions worth watching

  • Can he play the 2 instead of the 3? He played mostly the 3 at USF. For his NBA case it would help to log meaningful reps as a 2-guard. If he can switch up there and be effective as a creator, his length defensively and on the boards becomes an absolute superpower, a 6-6 lefty with plus verticality at the off-guard spot is a real defensive weapon.
  • Can he be a secondary ball-handler? When Payne is on the floor, can Riley handle some of the “break the press, get into offense” work himself? He doesn't have to do it all the time, but if Oregon doesn't have to play two true ball-handlers at all times, the lineup combinations open up dramatically.

The defensive fit is obvious. Oregon is set up to play heavy trap and heavy matchup zone this year. Altman went out and signed wings 6-5 to 6-9 who can switch and shoot; Riley is the prototype. The lefty length, the athleticism, the engagement on the offensive boards; all of it shows up on defense in that scheme too.

Jasper Johnson SO · 6-5 · Combo G · Kentucky · BPR +3.74

For the love of god, can we get this kid in the weight room? Get him keys to the building, have him make friends with Nasir Wyatt, have him eat what Nasir eats and lift what Nasir lifts. He needs strength in the worst way; he might be the skinniest kid I've ever seen in major college basketball. Genuinely sad story, and I'm rooting hard for the rebound.

The path here

Local Lexington kid who dreamed of playing for Kentucky, played for Kentucky, and got chewed up and spit out. He wasn't what they were hoping he was going to be, got put in a position to fail, did fail, and got essentially run out of his hometown. That is a tragic college basketball story regardless of how the basketball part shakes out, and the basketball part on the front end was very, very promising.

All through the AAU and EYBL circuit it was obvious: 6-5, long, lefty, combo guard who can really, really shoot. He played really well in the junior circuit, the kind of kid who would go catch a heater and drop a stack of points on you in a hurry. Quick trigger, great stroke. He might be the best shooter on this Oregon team. Meadow's right there with him, but there's a real chance Jasper is the best shooter on the roster.

Why his Kentucky year went sideways

Two things went wrong, layered on top of each other.

First, Overtime Elite. After EYBL his junior year, he went to OTE for his senior year of high school. They don't really run offense there. They claim it's "individual skill development," but in practice it's everyone trying to be James Harden: iso, dribble moves, shake-and-bake, hunt your own shot. You could see it in Jasper's senior tape. He spent a year being trained into the wrong player. The North Star … not the ceiling, the North Star … should be somewhere between Rip Hamilton and Klay Thompson: sharp off screens, around corners, catching with his feet set, firing. Not James Harden. OTE pointed him at the wrong model.

Second, the Jaland Lowe injury. Lowe (transfer in from Pitt) dislocated his shoulder in the Blue-White game, kept playing through it, and ultimately had to shut it down nine games in. Kentucky had no other real point guards. So they moved Jasper up to be the primary ball-handler behind Denzel Aberdeen (since transferred back to Florida). It went badly. His handle is too loose to be a primary, and he is not strong enough; the SEC absolutely ate him alive on ball. He'd get bumped off his spot, lose confidence, end up taking bad shots out of busted possessions. By the end of the year he had worked his way out of the rotation and only played sparingly in the NCAA tournament.

The shot chart

Jasper Johnson shot chart, 2025-26 Kentucky
Almost no midrange volume, lots of activity at the rim, and three-point attempts well beyond the line. Real range.

Two things to like immediately. One: the midrange is largely empty; he isn't wasting possessions on inefficient pull-ups, the shot diet is correct. Two: look at the depth on some of those three-point attempts. There are makes well beyond the line … logo-range stuff … with at least a couple of green hexes that deep, meaning he hit one or two of them. That is genuinely insane range for a 6-5 sophomore. He shot 34% from three on real volume and 88% from the line. The free throw number is the tell; this guy can really, really shoot. The interior is also encouraging: he isn't afraid to drive the ball, and when he gets all the way to the rim he finishes at a real rate.

Where his offense came from

Jasper Johnson play type breakdown, 2025-26 Kentucky
The miscasting in one chart. Every off-ball play type comes out green. The PnR Passer bar is in the 94th percentile of frequency, and the 26th percentile of efficiency.

This is one of the cleanest "wrong role" charts you'll see all year. Every play type that uses him as an off-ball shooter … Perimeter Sniper, Dribble Jumper, Hits Cutter, even Mid-Range … is in the high-50s to high-70s percentile in efficiency on real volume. Every play type that uses him as a ball-handler falls off a cliff.

The bar-by-bar:

  • Perimeter Sniper: 1.03 PPP, 66.6th percentile, 6.0 per 100. Top-decile frequency, top-third efficiency. This is the player.
  • Hits Cutter: 1.13 PPP, 79.5th percentile, 1.9 per 100. When he passes on the move, it works.
  • Dribble Jumper: 0.99 PPP, 73.3rd percentile, 2.2 per 100. Pull-ups in rhythm, another green bar.
  • Mid-Range: 0.78 PPP, 51.1st percentile, 2.4 per 100. Mid-pack on low volume. Not a problem.
  • Rim Attack: 0.81 PPP, 41.9th percentile, 4.6 per 100. Decent volume, slightly below average efficiency. Not bad, not great.
  • PnR Passer: 0.93 PPP, 26.2nd percentile, 4.5 per 100 (94th percentile in frequency). Kentucky ran him as a primary pick-and-roll initiator at a top-decile rate, and he delivered in the bottom quartile of efficiency. Over and over and over. Pope didn't seem to have another option, so the same broken action got run on loop.
  • Transition: 1.14 PPP, 32.0th percentile, 4.7 per 100. High volume, mid-pack efficiency. He's fast enough to get out, but he isn't an explosive vertical athlete and he isn't strong; in transition he's not breaking the rim. He's a skill-level finisher in transition, not an athlete one.
  • Reb. & Scramble: 0.79 PPP, 6.3rd percentile, 1.5 per 100. Rock bottom. The strength piece shows up here too; live-ball scrambles are a body-against-body event, and he loses every one of them.

Translation: Kentucky's two highest-frequency play types for him were PnR Passer (94th percentile in frequency, 26th in efficiency) and Transition (high volume, 32nd in efficiency), both ball-in-his-hands actions, both red. The high-skill-level off-ball stuff he's actually good at also got volume, but a third-to-half of his usage was being spent on the wrong actions.

The rate stats tell the same story

  • Three-point rate 60%, great. Literally what he should be doing. Shoots threes 60% of the time he shoots.
  • Assist rate 23%, legitimately strong on the surface, but probably not sustainable in his real role at Oregon, because…
  • Turnover rate 22%, an abomination. Direct consequence of being asked to handle. Got his pocket picked constantly. The OTE bag does not work in the SEC.
  • Free throw rate 16%; he almost never went to the line. Shies away from contact, and SEC defenders punished him every time he tried.

Off-ball, in a Klay/Rip role, that 22% turnover number drops by half almost mechanically; you can't lose the ball if you're not handling it. The 23% assist rate also won't be 23% anymore, but that's fine; we have other initiators. What stays is the shooting, the cutting reads, and the defense.

The North Star problem

His off-ball, catch-and-shoot version was good and showed the upside. The OTE-leftover, dribble-dribble-step-back version was bad. Jasper Johnson does not need to be James Harden. The model he should be chasing is Klay Thompson or Rip Hamilton: off ball screens, around corners, feet set, fire. To be clear: Klay and Rip are not his ceiling. They're nowhere near his ceiling. They're the kind of player he should be trying to be … the right archetype to study and copy … and that's a different (and much more useful) thing than a projection of where he ends up. Pick the right North Star, take the on-ball primary-handler version of him off the table, and we find out how good a version of that archetype he can become.

Strength is the gating issue

I'm serious about the weight room. The thing that broke his Kentucky year wasn't talent; it was that SEC defenders could just body him off his spots and off his cuts. He'd get moved physically, lose his shooting pocket, and the whole possession would collapse. He needs to be a year-round project for the Oregon strength staff. Get him on the Nasir Wyatt program. Add 15 lbs of real mass before fall, and the whole tier of player he is in 26-27 changes.

The Easter swap

This one is going to come back up when we get to Jerry Easter, but it's the central thesis on both players. Kentucky tried to make a shooter into a primary ball-handler. USC tried to make a primary ball-handler into a floor-spacing wing. If you flipped them … Easter into Jasper's Kentucky role, Jasper into Easter's USC role … you have a very different story for both kids. Oregon's job is to recognize that and put each of them in the role the other one was failing in.

What he does well

  • Shooting. Possibly the best on the team. Quick trigger, high release, great stroke, real range. Lefty mechanics that are clean and repeatable.
  • Self-creation as a scorer. Can go get a shot when needed; the AAU/EYBL tape is clear on this. He's a real bucket-getter when the role lets him be one.
  • Length and lateral quickness on defense. 6-5 with real length. Plays the passing lanes. As a 2-guard defender he's a clear plus, another piece in this team's emerging "long, switchable, ball-hawk" defensive identity.
  • Fits the lefty pattern. Compton, Riley, Payne, and Jasper are all lefties, the same archetype Altman built around with the Harmon / Young / Williams teams.

The concerns

  • Strength. Number one issue. By a lot. Until he adds mass, the SEC-style "body him off his spots" problem follows him to the Big Ten.
  • Loose handle for a primary. Don't ask him to run point. He calls himself a combo guard, the staff thinks he has some PG qualities, but the on-ball-vs-off-ball gap is real and the on-ball version is not who he is right now.
  • OTE habits. The over-dribbling, hero-ball muscle memory needs to be coached out. He has to relearn how to play off the ball at a high level; that's a real coaching project, not a freebie.
  • Confidence. He took a real beating last year … in his own hometown … and there's a real chance he shows up tentative early in the year. The first 5-10 games matter for his head as much as his game.

The downside case

That whole writeup … the shot chart, the play types, the rate stats, the Easter swap … is the optimistic read. It assumes the bad numbers (the 22% turnover rate, the 16% free throw rate, the 6th-percentile rebound-and-scramble efficiency) are role-dependent. Take him off the ball, give him the right job, and they go away.

The downside read is that they don't go away because they're not about role. They're who he is. He has now put up a full year of those numbers. That is not a five-game slump. The pessimistic version is: his handle is just genuinely loose, he genuinely shies from contact, he is genuinely too small to play through bodies, and changing the role doesn't change any of that. The other piece of the pessimistic version is psychological, that he refuses to embrace the catch-and-shoot role and insists on being the dribble-into-a-step-back player OTE trained him to be. If that's the version that shows up at Oregon, then he's a one-dimensional shooter with bad turnover and rebound habits playing through a body the Big Ten can move around, and he isn't a high-leverage piece on this roster.

I want to believe this is role-dependent. I think it probably is. But it's a real risk and it's worth saying out loud.

Pope and Jasper agree on the diagnosis

Two quotes from the back half of last season worth knowing about. Mark Pope said publicly that putting Jasper at backup point guard "probably wasn't fair," that it shouldn't have been his role, that he should have been a combo scoring guard, and that they only made him a primary because they didn't have other options. That's the head coach saying out loud that the role was wrong.

Then, after the season, Jasper himself said the things he most needed to work on were tightening up his handle, getting in the weight room, and putting on muscle. So the kid knows what the issue is too.

Both ends of the relationship agree on the diagnosis. The question is just whether the work gets done.

Fit at Oregon

For the love of god, don't have him play point guard. The fit here is straightforward: catch-and-shoot 2-guard, off-ball movement off Compton/Stewart screens, attacking closeouts, defending the opposing 2 in Altman's matchup zone. If we use him correctly … and if the strength piece comes along … the same kid who was a top-25 national recruit a year ago is suddenly a real high-leverage shooter on a deep roster. The ceiling is real, the path is obvious, and the bet is on his head and his body, not his game.

This is the third or fourth player on this list who falls into the same bucket: everybody thought he was going to be a lot more last year, and it didn't happen. Aristode underperformed in volume. Riley underperformed his role. Stewart underperformed because of position. Bol Bowen underperformed at Alabama. Easter underperformed at USC. Jasper underperformed at Kentucky. The whole roster construction is built around the idea that we can put each of these guys in a role that lets the version we believe in actually show up. Jasper's the most obvious of the group. Rooting hard for the kid.

Taylor Bol Bowen SR · 6-10 · Big · Alabama · BPR +3.08

Honest framing up front: I wasn't a huge fan of going after him. He looks like Chris Boucher … 6-10, super long, runs the floor, hits threes, blocks shots … but in the stats that actually matter he's roughly half of a Boucher. Tantalizing version of an archetype that's never quite become the archetype.

Bol Bowen highlight reel.

The path here

No. 22 in 247Sports' class of 2023 (No. 73 Composite). Two years at Florida State, okay as a freshman, then the breakout sophomore year that made him a coveted portal piece: 41.4% from three on 70 attempts, 78% FT, 7.1% block rate. Alabama scooped him out of the portal and immediately changed the role: a low-usage (14.9%) pick-and-pop big: set the screen, pop to the arc, shoot if it comes. The high-leverage piece they thought they got, deployed in a low-leverage way.

The arc inside that Alabama year is the part that matters. He came out of the gate firing: 17 and 9 vs St. John's at MSG in game 2, 12 points on 5-of-6 in the second half vs Maryland in the Players Era Festival a few weeks later. Then SEC play started and he fell off a cliff. He played through an undisclosed hamstring injury most of conference play, his minutes got restricted, the Alabama fanbase soured. He tore up a Final-Four-caliber St. John's defense in November; he's capable of producing against high-major bodies. Whatever happened in January and February isn't the ceiling.

I'd also say I would have preferred those funds had gone toward the guard problem we had at the time. We're cleaner there now. But that's the context of the get.

The shot chart

Taylor Bol Bowen shot chart, 2025-26 Alabama
Three-point heavy, green at the rim, almost nothing in the midrange. The right shot diet for the archetype.

The 30.2% from three last year is misleading. 79.6% from the FT line tells you he's a real shooter; the FSU sophomore year (41.4% on volume) tells you the same thing. Honest projection on the three is high-30s. He also finished 70% at the rim on real volume at Alabama, driving a 61.5% two-point clip; the interior finishing was good last year too.

Where his offense came from

Taylor Bol Bowen play type breakdown, 2025-26 Alabama
One huge bar, mid-pack efficiency. Almost everything else is small-sample, and almost all green.

Pick-and-pop dominates: 3.9 per 100, 47.2nd percentile efficiency. The rest of the chart is tiny volume but elite where it shows up:

  • Pick & Pop: 0.95 PPP, 47.2nd percentile, 3.9 per 100. The dominant role.
  • Big Cut & Roll: 1.52 PPP, 99.3rd percentile, 1.3 per 100. When they let him roll instead of pop, it worked.
  • Post-Up: 1.10 PPP, 98.4th percentile, 2.2 per 100. Real post threat that wasn't asked to be.
  • Inside-Out / High-Low: 83.0 / 88.3rd percentile efficiency on small volume.
  • Reb. & Scramble / Transition: 67.7 / 45.3rd percentile, 1.7 / 2.7 per 100.

The takeaway: he was good at things Alabama almost never let him do. Small samples come with the caveat that 1.3 Big Cut & Roll possessions per 100 doesn't extrapolate cleanly to a featured role, but the efficiency floor on diversified reps suggests Oregon can broaden his offensive job profitably.

The three-year trajectory

  • Block rate: 5.0% → 7.1% → 4.8%. FSU sophomore is the high-water mark.
  • Three-point rate: 21.2% → 41.4% → 30.2%. Sophomore year is the real shooter signal.
  • Turnover rate: 19.8% → 20.5% → 12.1%. Role-driven, not improvement; Alabama just took the ball out of his hands.
  • Assist rate: always low (4.1 / 6.2 / 3.8). Don't run offense through him.

Tape vs. stats vs. on-off: mirror image of Aristode

Aristode: the tape looks unbelievable, the counting stats are pedestrian, the on/off says he makes everyone better. Tape and on-off agree.

Bol Bowen: the tape is fine, the counting stats … threes, blocks … look great, but the on/off impact at every stop quietly tells a different story. The team scoreboard with him on the floor doesn't match what the box says.

One stop is noise. Three stops in a row of the same pattern is a signal, not loud, but real. The threes and blocks are real. They just don't seem to be doing as much for the team as they look like they're doing on paper.

The volume falls short of the frame

For a 6-10 with this length, the rates are quietly underwhelming. 6.0% ORB, 15.5% DRB, 4.8% Blk at Alabama. Against Stewart (10.5 / 26.0 / 4.6) he's at roughly 60% of the rebounding rates on a 6-9 frame. Against Boucher's career at Oregon (11.8 / 11.0 / 20.3 Blk/ORB/DRB), he's at 40% / 55% / 75%. You watch him for five seconds and expect more than you get. That's probably why the Alabama fanbase soured by year's end.

What he does well

  • The shot. True high-30s three-point shooter at 6-10. Floor-spacing 4 we didn't have.
  • Switchable size. Survives on a guard for a possession.
  • High-major experience. Three years of starts at FSU and Alabama. Ready in November.

The concerns

  • Looks the part more than he plays the part. Half-Boucher across three stops.
  • On/off below the counting stats at every stop. Threes and blocks loud, team impact quieter.
  • Health. Undisclosed hamstring derailed the back half of last year.

Fit at Oregon

Opens the year as a starter; the shot at the 4 unlocks Stewart at the 5, and the high-major reps matter early. The expectation is that Compton or Aristode takes a run at his minutes by midseason and probably gets the bulk of them. The hope is he holds the job: that the hamstring is the explanation, the FSU sophomore shooter is the real one, and he's a starting-level stretch 4 for a full year. The fallback … really good backup big on a deep frontcourt … is still a high-value role.

Fred Payne SR · 6-1 · Combo G · Boston College · BPR +3.02

I read another reviewer make the case that there were games last year where Boston College might not have scored at all without Fred Payne, and I think they're right. BC shot 29.4% from three for the season … 357th in D1, quite literally the worst shooting team in major college basketball … with no real interior scoring or post game either. They still won four ACC games. That should be impossible, and a lot of how it wasn't is Fred Payne.

Fred Payne tape.

The Oregon comp

When I watch him, the first guy I think of is De'Vion Harmon. He moves like Harmon, plays like Harmon, has the same heft and length on a 6-1/6-2 frame. The stat line lands closer to Keeshawn Barthelemy. So somewhere between those two: not the team's number-one option, but a steady, good scoring guard who can go get his own shot, hit big shots, and really shoot, and on the Harmon side of the comp, a plus defender, not a hole.

The path here

Five games into his freshman year at BC, Payne went up for a rebound against Central Connecticut and came down on his right leg wrong: torn knee ligaments and a torn hamstring. Redshirted the rest of 23-24. Came back as a bench piece in 24-25 still working his way back. Then this past season, with BC expecting him to be the second option behind their main guy, he just took over, clear number-one option from early in the year. Carried the load. Grambling, Louisiana kid; reads as a real team leader.

The shot chart

Fred Payne shot chart, 2025-26 Boston College
A scattered chart in the most literal sense: shots from everywhere, with a heavy floater/midrange cluster inside the lane.

The chart's all over the place. He shot 55% at the rim last year (worse in prior years), and FTR is only 17%; he doesn't barrel into contact, very Barthelemy. He'd rather pull up for a midrange floater or a little pop before he gets all the way home, which is exactly why the inside-the-lane cluster looks like it does.

Fun aside: Payne is a lefty, but watch his floater. He shoots almost all of his floaters in the lane right-handed. Doesn't matter the angle. From ten feet in, he prefers the right hand. You won't notice it until you remember he's left-handed and realize he just shot one with the wrong hand.

Where his offense came from, and the grain of salt

Fred Payne play type breakdown, 2025-26 Boston College
The bar heights are frequency per 100 team possessions while he's on the floor, not just personal distribution. The bars are huge because BC went to him for everything.

Reading the chart: every visible bar is shots/possessions per 100 team possessions while he's on the floor. Sum the visible volume and Payne is involved in roughly a third of every BC possession. That's a giant usage signal. When he was on the court, the offense ran through him; period.

Watching BC games felt like early-2000s Sixers basketball: dump it to Payne with no time left, go be Allen Iverson, rescue the possession. With that context, "50th percentile efficiency" on most of the chart isn't a knock; making something out of nothing 50% of the time on a team with no shooting and no inside game is good. The percentages should come up meaningfully when there's actually offense around him.

  • Attack & Kick: 0.84 PPP, 7.3rd percentile, 4.3 per 100. The dark-red bar that jumps off the chart. This isn't a Payne problem; it's a teammates problem. When the rest of your team shoots 27% from three, kicking out can't return points.
  • Mid-Range: 0.89 PPP, 80.5th percentile, 2.7 per 100. The most efficient bar on the chart. The shot type itself is inherently low-EV, so 80th percentile here is impressive.
  • Perimeter Cut: 1.21 PPP, 57.6th percentile, 0.7 per 100. Low volume, decent.
  • Transition: 1.22 PPP, 49.3rd percentile, 5.7 per 100. Big volume, mid-pack efficiency.
  • Rim Attack: 0.86 PPP, 53.9th percentile, 6.2 per 100. Decent self-creation at the rim despite the contact aversion.
  • Perimeter Sniper / PnR Passer / Hits Cutter: 49 / 48 / 51st percentile efficiency. Mid-pack across the board. Workmanlike.
  • Reb. & Scramble: 0.84 PPP, 8.2nd percentile, 1.7 per 100. Body-against-body events; he loses these. Same theme as the FTR.

The rate stats:

  • 3PT: 31.5% on 213 attempts. Career FT 82% (88% in 24-25, 77% in 25-26). Honest projection in a real offense: 37-39%.
  • FTR 17%: very low. Allergic to the rim, in the Jackson Shelstad family.
  • USG 24.7% with TO% 10: elite ball security on a heavy primary load. You can't get the ball off him. The only other player on this roster with comparable ball security is Tyrone Riley at 9%, and Riley wasn't being asked to be the lead initiator. Payne was. A 10% TO rate on a 24.7% usage as a primary handler is a genuine plus-tier trait; it's a steady-contributor floor under everything else.
  • AST% 18%: not what you look for in a true PG; he was really a combo two for BC. The passing IQ is there to handle a primary role at Oregon, but that number is the call to keep him as a creator-scorer rather than a pure floor general.

Some of the scouting world is higher on him than the models

Worth flagging: while many efficiency-driven models are tepid on Payne … and a few of the scouting services (247 in particular) are low on him … guys like Jeff Goodman were notably higher, and the gap is the BC context. Models and rankers who lean on raw efficiency punish him for the bad-shot diet BC forced him into; evaluators watching the tape can normalize for it.

By the higher-on-him tier, Payne lands in the same conversation as Mikey Lewis, Vyctorius Miller, and Dra Gibbs-Lawhorn; ahead of Abdi Bashir Jr. and Tylen Riley; and well ahead of Jayden Reid, Jaylen Curry, and Divine Ugochukwu.

Defense is real

Boston College was actually a good defensive team last year (4 ACC wins on offense alone shouldn't have been possible, and most of how it was possible is that the defense kept them in games). Payne was a meaningful part of that despite carrying the offensive load. Strong, sturdy, real lateral feet, plus length for the position. This isn't a player Oregon has to hide on defense.

The need he fills

Oregon desperately needed a starting ball-handler in this portal. After missing on Preston Edmead and Colby Garland … and after the brief Mikey Lewis chapter that probably wasn't really a primary-handler fit anyway (Lewis is more of a natural two and an instant-offense scorer) … landing Payne was a genuine blessing. At the time we got him, he was at or very near the best point guard remaining in the portal, and it dropped off fast below him.

What he does well

  • Real lead-guard offense. Self-creation, big-shot pedigree, 18.7% AST rate on 10% TOs.
  • Genuine shooter. Career 82% FT line says the 37-39% projection is the real talent.
  • Plus defender. Heft, length, lateral feet. BC's defense leaned on him.
  • Took over a bad team. Carried the offensive load on the worst-shooting team in the high majors. The reps under stress are valuable.

The concerns

  • Allergic to the rim. Shelstad-style avoidance of contact and the line. Could be coached up; could just be who he is.
  • Knee history. The freshman-year injury was significant. He's two seasons removed and looks fully back, but it's worth noting.
  • Top-end ceiling. The Harmon/Barthelemy comp is honest, really good rotation guard, not a top-line creator.

Fit at Oregon: floor, ceiling, and what to watch

Opening-day starting lead guard, and given the lack of ball-handling depth behind him, he's going to be on the floor a lot. The job: get the team into offense, hit shots when defenses help off, defend without giving anything back.

The downside: he keeps hunting bad shots even when he doesn't have to; the BC habits stick, and he plays inefficiently in a context that doesn't require it. With limited backup at the position, those minutes are hard to absorb. Real risk.

The ceiling: he recognizes how much more talent he has around him than he did at BC and goes on a real shot diet. In that version, his percentages jump, the AST% comes up with real shooters to find, and he becomes the team's third, fourth, or fifth best player. If you're taking bets on the team's leading scorer next year, he's a great one. The 25-26 minutes load + 26-27 talent around him + a shot diet adjustment = a really useful guard. That's the bet.

What this roster still needs: another ball-handler

Bright spot of how this roster's being built: lots of pieces with wide projection variance. With 14 players, that's actually good; the ones who exceed projection get the minutes, the ones who fall short don't. Variance is a feature on a deep roster.

The exception is the lead-guard spot. When you only have one true ball-handler, projection variance becomes risk, not a feature. Payne might be incredible. Payne might be bad. There's a real range of outcomes, and we don't have a real fallback. Easter and Jasper can handle the ball in a pinch, but neither one should be cast as a starter and have the season hung on him at the position.

I would really, really appreciate it if Oregon added another portal ball-handler to the mix. Granted, this take may be partly PTSD from spending an entire season last year watching Drew Carter … a walk-on … bring the ball up the floor in Big Ten play once the guard rotation collapsed. Once burned…

Andrew Meadow SR · 6-7 · Wing · Boise State · BPR +2.37

First, the elephant in the room

Andrew Meadow at Boise State; long hair, glasses, big smile, an icon
Before: a genuine icon.
Andrew Meadow's Oregon photoshoot; clean cut, tatted up, generic-bro vibe
After: drove a Jeep Wrangler to practice.

He used to look so great. A genuine icon. The look you build entire marketing campaigns around, the kind of look that gets you remembered forever, beloved by an entire community for decades after you're gone.

And now he looks like a JAG who drove his Jeep Wrangler to practice and popped out with a bag of Chipotle or something.

Andrew, we could've had it all… rolling in the deep. You had my heart inside of your hands, and you played it to the beat.

This tape is from two years ago, but the profile is largely the same; he's just gotten a little better at everything since. Representative of the kind of player he is now.

The models don't all line up on him

There's a moderate spread on Meadow's projection. EvanMiya runs a little low; a few other rate-stat services are similar. Bart Torvik, by contrast, has him as the highest-PORPAG returning player on this roster, 3.14 last year, top-of-the-team. The spread isn't enormous and it's not like we don't know what we're getting: Meadow has the most production of anyone on this roster, and it's all efficient. The disagreement is about what level of player that production translates to in the Big Ten and whether his defense can keep him on the floor, not about whether the production is real.

Oregon went after him with intent

It's worth saying out loud: Oregon came out fast on Meadow. Same kind of intent as the early offers to Riley and Compton, foundational-piece intent, not let's-fill-out-the-bench intent. At the time it looked a little surprising, kind of a "stash a quality body" move. With the benefit of hindsight and looking at how the rest of the roster fits, I suspect he may start for us.

The skill set

He's 6-7, bigger than he looks, with real positional flexibility, 3 or 4 by default, can slide up to the 2 in the right lineup. The offense is the headline:

  • 3PT: 38.7% on 106 attempts. Real shooter on real volume.
  • 2P: 61.3%. Finishes at the rim and doesn't waste possessions.
  • FTR 43.6%: takes the ball hard at the paint and gets to the line all the time.
  • TS 61.4% on 17.4% USG: efficient from everywhere: threes, finishes, free throws.
  • TO% 10: doesn't lose the ball. Same quiet ball-security tier as Payne.

This is a third-best player on a bubble Boise State team in one of the better mid-majors. He'd start on a tournament team last year, not just start, be a real piece of one. 67 career starts, substantial mileage, super dependable.

Ball security: the cross-roster pattern

Worth pausing on the turnover rates this portal class brought in. Across roughly twenty Oregon regulars (players with at least 30% of team minutes) over the last three seasons, the best turnover rate was Kario Oquendo at 10.9%, with Couisnard (11.0%) and Barthelemy (11.7%) right behind.

Compare that to the 25-26 numbers for our three incoming wings/guards:

  • Tyrone Riley: 9.0%, would be the lowest of any Oregon regular in three years
  • Fred Payne: 10.0%, tied for #2 with Meadow
  • Andrew Meadow: 10.0%, tied for #2 with Payne

If you grafted these three onto the last three Oregon rotations, they'd be 1-2-3 in ball security, ahead of the entire field. I don't think that's an accident. I think you may be looking at the starting 1-2-3.

The shot chart

Andrew Meadow shot chart, 2025-26 Boise State
Heavy three-point volume from above the break and both corners, cluster at the rim, very little wasted in the midrange.

The diet is right. Three-point volume from everywhere along the arc, real green at the rim, the midrange is mostly empty. 68% at the rim, 61% on twos, 39% on threes on real volume, an extremely modern, extremely efficient shot profile. Worth noting too: the range extends comfortably well out into NBA distance; there are makes a step or two beyond the college arc on the chart.

The one number that will freak people out is the 65% from the line last year, way out of step with everything else here. The year before that he shot 84%. I'm calling the 65% an aberration. The shot is real, the FT history says it's real, and (this is just a personal theory) maybe losing the glasses had something to do with it. Either way, banking on a meaningful regression up.

Where his offense came from, and the underutilization story

Andrew Meadow play type breakdown, 2025-26 Boise State
The whole chart is green. Every play type Boise put him in finished in the high 70s percentile or better, most of them in the 90s.

This is the chart that screams "massively underutilized." Look at the percentile labels. The bars he had volume on are 90+ across the board:

  • Rim Attack: 1.06 PPP, 93.4th percentile, 4.3 per 100. The most-used action. Top-decile efficiency.
  • Perimeter Sniper: 1.27 PPP, 96.3rd percentile, 3.4 per 100. Elite catch-and-shoot.
  • Perimeter Cut: 1.43 PPP, 92.3rd percentile, 1.6 per 100. Cuts off ball perfectly.
  • Reb. & Scramble: 1.36 PPP, 78.3rd percentile, 1.6 per 100. Cleans up live-ball plays.
  • Attack & Kick: 1.11 PPP, 92.2nd percentile (low volume).
  • Dribble Jumper / Pick & Pop / Big Cut & Roll / Post-Up / Inside-Out / High-Low: all 91-96th percentile efficiency on tiny volumes; never used him in those actions, but the few times Boise did, it worked.
  • PnR Passer: 1.10 PPP, 79.2nd percentile. Decent reads when given the keys.
  • Transition: 1.22 PPP, 48.9th percentile, 4.0 per 100. The lone non-elite bar.

This isn't a player you stretch with role expansion; this is a player who was already capping out a fixed role and never got asked for more. Only takes good shots. Scores efficiently in every action they tried. The offensive engine reads as way bigger than the 18% usage at Boise.

The Brandon Angel parallel: the scary version of the comp

This profile reads a lot like Brandon Angel coming into Oregon two years ago: efficiency numbers across the board that look unreal, an offensive game that grades out as elite from every distance and every play type. Angel would have been great. Except he turned out to be an awful rebounder and a really bad defender, and the gap between him and Kwame Evans on those ends was a canyon.

Meadow's defense is average; that's the optimistic read. The pessimistic read is that he's the same Angel-style efficient offensive piece who quietly leaks value on the other end and on the glass.

The defense exception

I haven't talked much about defense in these previews, and that's not because I'm overlooking it. It's because every single other player Oregon targeted is a plus or plus-plus defender. Length, athleticism, defensive prowess at every spot. There are zero guys on this roster who were defensive negatives at their last stop.

Meadow is the only one who's even close to being an exception. Three years in a row, by almost every model, he grades as a merely average D1 defender, not bad, not a hole, just average. On any other roster, that's fine. On this one, he stands out as the weakest defender getting real minutes. The team has the potential to be an absolute defensive juggernaut, and Meadow is the one piece that doesn't quite hit that ceiling on that end.

He's the session guitar at Juilliard. Perfectly competent. Surrounded by virtuosos.

Fit at Oregon: the least confident call on the roster

Honest framing: he's the least confident starting-lineup call I have. The Torvik view, the early-and-aggressive Oregon offer, the 67 starts in a real conference, and the across-the-board efficiency all point to him opening the year as the starting wing. So does the way the rest of the roster fits around him.

It also wouldn't be even a little surprising if Aristode takes the 3 over him by the end of training camp, or if Meadow holds it for the entire year. Both outcomes are firmly within range. He's a senior, he was the third-best player on a bubble team last year, he's been to war, and we're lucky to have him. Whether he's a 30-minute starter or a high-leverage 18-minute weapon off the bench, the offense alone earns the spot. The defense and rebounding will tell us which one.

Tajh Ariza FR · 6-9 · Wing · Newcomer · BPR +2.34

6-9 with a near-7-foot wingspan, son of Trevor Ariza, top-30 recruit in the 2026 class. He's a finisher and a connector with a broader skill set than his dad ever had. He can shoot, he can handle, he's a good kid who understands the game. He's not as physically hard-nosed as Trevor was, but he has a broader offensive skill set.

The path here

Westchester High School in Los Angeles, then a transfer to St. John Bosco in April 2025, then a transfer to Link Academy (Branson, Missouri) in October 2025 for his senior year. Link is one of those super-hub prep schools that puts five or six D1 players on the floor at the same time; Jerry Easter went there too. At Link, Tajh was a rotation piece, not a primary part of their plan, and his recruiting ranking fell quite a bit.

His junior year at Westchester he averaged 27 points and 14 rebounds as a primary and was a MaxPreps Junior All-American. Then a lower-body injury in summer 2025 cost him most of the AAU/EYBL window after his junior season, and by the time he was healthy and at Link, he was coming off the bench. The ranking dropped from the mid-teens nationally into the 30s.

By the end of his senior year he had earned a featured spot back in the Link rotation and took home a tournament MVP late in the year, then went on the spring all-star circuit and showed he still belonged with the top end of the class. Highlights from the MVP game (he's #10, with the great hair):

The Dana shooting story

Probably apocryphal but worth repeating: the story is that early in the recruitment, Dana watched Tajh shoot and offered a small mechanical tweak. The next reps were better. Tajh made more of them. The next thing that happened was a commitment to Oregon. Whether the story is exactly true or not, he committed in October 2025.

The skill profile

The Ariza last name carries a specific archetype: long, athletic, hard-nosed defender, low-usage offensive piece who makes the corner three and finishes in transition. Tajh is a different player. He's not the hard-nosed defender Trevor was. What he is: a good player with a real connector profile, a real skill set, and a great frame. He can shoot, he can put the ball on the floor at 6-9, he knows where to be and where to go with the ball. Good passer for his size. The comparison to his dad is mostly just the last name; the game is different.

The spring all-star circuit

He played in the Nike Hoop Summit two years in a row for Team World (representing Japan via his eligibility). That's not a small thing; getting invited once is meaningful, getting invited twice means the scouting consensus held him in the elite class through the volatility of his senior year. His 2026 box read like a connector's line: 22 minutes, 1-of-4 from the field, 2-of-2 from the line, 5 rebounds, 3 assists, 2 steals. He's not a primary creator and shouldn't be evaluated like one. The scoring number on its own undersells what was actually on the floor.

The other late-spring events landed better. He played the Iverson Classic (May 2026, on the roster), and at the Jordan Brand Classic he led Team Flight in scoring with 20 points on 8-of-13 shooting in 19 minutes, plus 8 rebounds, 2 assists, 3 steals. That's the version of Tajh Ariza that gets you excited.

The strength piece

Watching him at the Hoop Summit, Tyran Stokes (the #1 recruit in the 2026 class) struggled to finish over Team World's length all afternoon. The one guy he could get clean looks against was Tajh; Stokes was able to push him down on the block a few times and convert. It's not the worst thing in the world to get beat by the number one prospect in the country, but it definitely showed that Ariza needs to add strength. He has the frame for it.

Where he fits

Tajh Ariza is the freshman in the rotation. He doesn't need to start; he doesn't need to be the lead anything. What he does need to do is the connector-piece work: cut, space, rebound, defend wings, attack in transition, take the open three. EM has him at +2.34 BPR projected for his freshman year, which is solid rotation-level production for a true freshman. If he adds strength through the summer, he could log real minutes early, especially in the small-ball looks where Oregon wants a long athletic five-out group.

The upside

The all-star circuit version of him (Jordan Brand Classic, 20 points on 60%) is the version that the recruiting consensus is paying for. If that version shows up at Oregon, with a year of strength development and Altman finding spots for him in the rotation, the ceiling is real. The Nike Hoop Summit version (modest box, pushed off spots) is the floor. Most heralded freshmen land somewhere between those two poles in their first college year. He's no different.

What he does well

  • Length. 6-9 with a near-7-foot wingspan. Real defensive tools, real shot-contest range, real passing windows for his size.
  • Shooting. Real form, a real college three-ball already. Dana's tweak (apocryphal or not) is the kind of thing that pays compound interest.
  • Handle for size. He can take a defensive rebound and push the ball himself. Limits the number of bad outlets you have to make.
  • Connecting. Smart cutter, good passer for the position, comfortable in flow offense. Fits Altman's stuff.
  • Pedigree. Two-time Hoop Summit invite, Jordan Brand Classic standout, two-time MaxPreps junior nod at his prior school. The consensus on him hasn't broken even when the year got messy.

What he doesn't (yet)

  • Strength. The biggest hole. Got pushed around on the block at the Hoop Summit. Needs weight and core work. Standard heralded-freshman problem, but it's a real one.
  • The wallflower risk. The downside scenario is he isn't aggressive enough as a connector and floats. Great connectors find ways to impact the game when they aren't scoring; some don't. It's a real possibility that he doesn't make himself useful enough off the ball to translate the skill set into impact.
  • The "hard-nosed" gene. Trevor was a different temperament. Tajh's identity is skill-first, not edge-first.
  • Injury history. The summer 2025 issue cost him a key development window. Not a chronic concern yet, but something to watch.
  • The Link role. He started his senior year coming off the bench. He had to work his way back in.

Bottom line: top-30 in the class, real two-way tools, the kind of skill-forward profile that pays off most for coaches like Altman who can find the right mix of role and development. The strength question gets answered in the weight room over the summer; everything else is already there.

He carries his dad's name, but the difference is this: when you saw Trevor, you said "whoa, that guy plays hard." When you see Tajh, you say "whoa, that kid's smooth." Different games. They can both be good.

Jerry Easter II SO · 6-5 · Combo G · USC · BPR +1.99

He's a very good high-major body who can't shoot. That will have to change for him to become more than really good bench depth. Borderline five-star recruit, USC freshman year that didn't work, the role he played there has very little to do with the player he was in high school, and I think a bounce-back is a real possibility.

Representative highlights.

The path here

Toledo kid. Emmanuel Christian (Division III HS) to La Lumiere (Indiana) to Link Academy (Missouri) for his senior year. Link's 2024-25 senior class put six players into Division I, with Easter running the backcourt as the team's primary creator. His junior summer on the EYBL circuit, he was 4th in scoring; his senior summer at Link, the role shifted and he was 4th in assists. Those leaderboards are loaded with the best players in a top-end recruiting class.

EYBL scoring leaders, Easter's junior summer: Easter ranked 4th
Junior summer, scoring.
EYBL Scholastic assists leaders, Easter's senior summer: Easter ranked 4th at 4.4 APG
Senior summer, assists.

EYBL leaders his junior (scoring) and senior (assists) summers. Both lists are loaded with the best players of a top-end 2025 class. This is the genesis of the optimism about Easter.

What happened at USC

USC under Eric Musselman runs an offense that stashes two players in the far corners as floor-spacers, then runs three-man actions and high pick-and-roll out of the top. They ended up with Alijah Arenas and Chad Baker-Mazara as the lead creators, and let Easter (the 6-5 ball-handler who'd just been 4th in EYBL in assists) sit in a corner and hopefully shoot threes. It didn't work. Easter can't shoot, so he wasn't a threat out of the corner. Arenas, when he played, was one of the least efficient high-usage players in college basketball; his shot chart is red in every direction. Watching Easter watch Arenas create the offense as the lead creator was ludicrous.

The result is the stat line and the play-type distribution below. He got minutes (28 games, 38% of available, started seven). He scored out of the midrange when he could, got fed as a cutter or a spacer in three-man actions, and rarely got to be the player his recruiting profile said he was. AST% of 9.6 isn't a primary ball-handler's number. It's the number you get when the offense isn't being run through you.

The shot chart

Jerry Easter shot chart, 2025-26 USC
Lots of red. The shot chart doesn't read kindly.

The shooting numbers are bad. 50% at the rim (14th percentile), 40% in the 2P midrange (decent, but the wrong shot for a guard), 23% from three on low volume. The one thing that gives you hope: 74% from the line. That's not a non-shooter's number, and it suggests the form is fixable. One real positive on the shot diet: at 18% three-point rate, he knows he can't shoot and doesn't pretend he can. Most of the chaos is at the rim and in the midrange, where the percentages aren't great either, but at least the shot diet is honest about what he is right now.

How he scores

Jerry Easter play-type breakdown, 2025-26 USC
Two interesting tells. Rim Attack and Mid-Range are decent on real volume. PnR Passer is the highest-efficiency on-ball role he gets, at almost no frequency.

The bar-by-bar:

  • Rim Attack: 0.91 PPP, 69th percentile, 3.3 per 100. Real downhill threat. His best play-type at real volume.
  • Mid-Range: 0.81 PPP, 60th percentile, 3.0 per 100. High volume, slightly below average. Not the shot you'd choose, but he's competent at it.
  • Perimeter Sniper: 0.71 PPP, 12th percentile, 2.4 per 100. The shooting problem in one bar.
  • Hits Cutter: 1.22 PPP, 95th percentile, 0.7 per 100. Elite passer to cutters in the small sample USC let him pass.
  • PnR Passer: 1.10 PPP, 79th percentile, 1.1 per 100. The headline upside trait. In the tiny sample USC ran him as a pick-and-roll initiator, he was top-quartile in efficiency. That bar should be 4-5 per 100, not 1.1. His EYBL assist-rate profile and his recruiting reputation as a creator both point in the same direction this bar does.
  • Perimeter Cut: 1.07 PPP, 26th percentile, 2.7 per 100. Real volume, low efficiency.
  • Transition: 1.01 PPP, 15th percentile, 2.5 per 100.

The rate stats

  • AST% 9.6, too low for a primary handler, fine for a secondary one.
  • TO% 18.9, higher than you want but the offense was chaos.
  • STL% 1.6, average for a guard.
  • ORB 4% / DRB 14%, strong rebounding for a 6-5 guard.
  • FTR ~37%, very good for a guard. He draws contact.
  • On-off splits. The advanced weighted on-off stats are mixed. They rank him as a roughly average, playable rotation guard, which combined with his recruiting profile is consistent with a good Big Ten rotation piece, just short of a starter. That's a useful floor for a true freshman.

Hoop-Explorer similar players

Hoop-Explorer's similar-freshman-year search returns a wide spread: a few names who developed into real college players, a few who didn't, a couple of current freshmen Oregon was reportedly looking at, and at the far optimistic end of the list a Pac-12 lottery-pick-caliber wing as the best-case scenario. The comp set is wide enough that the math doesn't tell you which Easter we're getting. That's a wide range of futures, which is what a 5-star freshman with one bad-team year should look like.

The Easter / Jasper swap

This one comes up in Jasper Johnson's writeup too because it's the central thesis on both players. USC put a guy with a primary-ball-handler recruiting profile into a corner-spacer role. Kentucky put a guy who should be a scoring combo into a primary-ball-handler role. Both collapsed. Flip them: put Easter at Kentucky as the backup behind Jaland Lowe, and put Jasper at USC as a wing spacer alongside whoever ran point, and I think the stories look completely different for both kids. Oregon's job is to recognize that and use each of them in the role the other one was failing in.

Where he fits

Easter is the 10th or 11th body in the rotation. That's where the bet sits. He doesn't need to be a primary creator. He needs to be the secondary backcourt body who backs up Fred Payne at the point, can play alongside Jasper Johnson in a long two-handler look, defends, rebounds, attacks the rim, and runs PnR when he's given the chance. He started seven games at SC as a true freshman, so the floor is "high-major capable body who doesn't get played off the court physically." That's already better than most of our wing rotation last year.

The upside scenario

Easter and Jasper Johnson, both 6-5 with length, playing together as the backcourt. Long, switchable, plus whichever frontcourt we stack behind them. The passing lanes against that group would be a nightmare for opposing offenses. It's not the projected starting backcourt for 26-27. It's a thing that could plausibly be the starting backcourt in 27-28 if both kids find the gear that their HS profiles said they had.

What he does well

  • Rim attack. 69th percentile efficiency on real volume. Downhill threat in PnR or against a closeout.
  • PnR passing. 79th percentile in efficiency in the tiny window USC gave him. His EYBL distributor profile and recruiting reputation say this is the real upside trait.
  • Defense. Steady defensive guard at the high-major level. Doesn't get bullied physically, holds up against the body of an opposing guard.
  • Rebounding. Strong for a 6-5 guard. 14% defensive rebound rate is meaningful at the position.
  • Free throw rate. ~37%, very good for a guard. Draws contact.
  • Free throw percentage. 74% suggests the jumper is fixable.

What he doesn't

  • Three-point shooting. 23% on low volume. He knows he can't shoot, which is honest but limiting.
  • Effective FG%. Sub-44%. Below high-major standard. Has to come up.
  • Assist rate. 9.6% is low. Some of that is role, but the live-ball handle needs to develop too.
  • Turnover rate. 18.9%. Handle is loose enough that defenders can poke through it.
Seven Spurlock FR · 6-4 · Wing · Newcomer · BPR +0.52

Really late addition to this class, came almost out of nowhere. He was committed to Arizona State until Bobby Hurley got fired in mid-March 2026. Spurlock decommitted, and we were in a great position to scoop him up. He brings a very different identity than the rest of the freshman class on this roster.

Who he is

6-4, 210 pounds, well-built already. Another lefty. I refuse to believe this is an accident. Hard-nosed and physical. The other 2026 freshman on this roster, Tajh Ariza, is the smooth skill player who doesn't bring his dad's edge. Spurlock has that edge. He'll pick up the opposing team's best perimeter player and check him up hard all game long. That's his identity.

The other tell on how hard-nosed he is defensively: at one point or another, he had offers from Auburn, Houston, Iowa, Missouri, Texas, Ole Miss, SMU, Texas A&M, and Rutgers before he picked Arizona State. Kelvin Sampson doesn't offer kids who don't bring the heat. Houston's offer list is its own scouting service for "this guy can defend." That's the kind of company he was keeping coming out of high school.

Where he comes from

Frisco, Texas. Played his prep career at Overtime Elite for Team FaZe. FaZe won the OTE championship in 2025-26, and Spurlock was named Finals MVP — 18.8 PPG across the finals series, with a 27-point Game 4 on 60% shooting.

The MVP run wasn't really about shot creation. The team they played in the finals just didn't have the bodies to match up with him physically around the basket, and he bullied his way to the rim and scored. That's a real thing he can do; it's not the same thing as half-court shot-making against college defenses. (I hesitate to even say this, but it's what Dillon Brooks did when he got to Oregon too: put his head down, physically bullied people to the rim for his shots, and the extreme shot-making came later. It's an unrealistic comp, but it's not out of the realm of possibility. Maybe a 1-in-20 shot.)

The OTE caveat applies more broadly too. That league's offensive structure doesn't really resemble a college offense, so you can't translate the specific scoring/playmaking numbers cleanly. He looked good; what that means for his half-court fit in a real system is genuinely unclear.

The skill profile

He's a 2 who doesn't really look for his own offense. When he does take a shot, it's usually charging toward the rim. He hunts simple good shots that he can actually make; not a lot of dalliances in his game. Hard-nosed, high-effort.

The shooting isn't there yet. He has the range out to three, but the volume and percentages aren't anywhere close to elite. He's pretty dynamic in transition: gets up, finishes, attacks the basket physically. The defense, transition, and physicality are the bedrock. The half-court shot creation and the jumper are the development questions.

The recruiting ranking

ESPN has him just outside the top 100. Rivals has him around #200. On3 lands at roughly #170. Maybe I have green-colored glasses on, but those numbers look low given the offer list. Houston and Texas aren't banging down the door of the 200th-best recruit in the country.

Where he fits

Deep, deep bench piece in year one. The high end is that he occasionally moonlights as a Mookie Cook role player: a couple of minutes here and there when we need a defensive jolt against an opposing scorer. That's the ceiling for him as a freshman, not the expectation. The offense is a serious work in progress. EM projects +0.52 BPR.

What he does well

  • Hard-nosed defense. Picks up the opposing best player and checks them up. Real physical intensity at the point of attack.
  • Body and frame. Already 210 pounds, well-built. Doesn't need a year of weight room to play physical against college bodies.
  • Transition. Gets up, finishes through contact, runs the floor.
  • Leadership / winning. OTE Finals MVP on a championship team. That's a real proof point for a freshman.
  • Offer pedigree. Auburn, Houston, Iowa. Programs that recruit defense knew exactly what he was.

What he doesn't (yet)

  • Shooting. Not a real three-point threat yet, despite the range. Has to come along for him to play big minutes.
  • OTE translation. Coming out of Overtime Elite, his half-court fit in a real college offense is an open question.
  • Half-court shot creation. He scores in transition and on physicality. The pull-up and the off-the-bounce stuff aren't there yet.

Bottom line: low-projection freshman with a real defensive identity and a championship resume from his prep year. The shooting is the gating issue for minutes; the body and the competitiveness already play at this level.